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Abstract
Export activity shapes workers’ experience-wage profiles. Using detailed Brazil-
ian manufacturing employer-employee and customs data, we document that workers’
experience-wage profiles are steeper at exporters than at non-exporters. Aside from self-
selection of more capable firms into exporting, we show that workers’ experience-wage
profiles are steeper when firms export to high-income destinations. We then develop
and quantify a model with export market entry, wage renegotiations, and human cap-
ital accumulation to interpret the data and perform counterfactual experiments. We
find that human capital growth can explain roughly 40% of differences in wage profiles
between exporters and non-exporters as well as the gains in experience returns after
entry into high-income destinations. We also show that increased human capital per
worker can account for one-half of the overall gains in real income from trade openness.
In slowing human capital accumulation, trade liberalization can induce welfare losses if
the trade partners are low-income destinations.
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1 Introduction
It is well-known that exporters are more productive than non-exporters. This differential
is partly driven by self-selection of more capable firms into export activity (e.g., Clerides
et al. 1998). There can also be productivity improvements after exporting. For example,
Atkin et al. (2017) find that exporting improves firms’ technical efficiency in a randomized
experiment, and De Loecker (2007) shows that firms’ productivity gains may increase when
firms export to high-income countries.1 These existing studies mostly focus on firm-level
outcomes, whereas exporting may impact workers and firms jointly. It is well-documented
that workers earn higher wages at exporters than at non-exporters (Bernard and Jensen
1995). However, despite much attention to firm-level differences in lifecycle wage growth in
recent studies (Herkenhoff et al. 2018, Jarosch et al. 2018, Gregory 2019),2 little is known
about how firms’ export activity shapes workers’ lifecycle wage dynamics.
We study empirically the relationship between a firm’s export activity and its workers’
wage profiles. We rely on Brazilian linked employer-employee data and customs records
between 1994–2010, assembling a long-run panel with detailed job information. To construct
experience-wage profiles, we measure a worker’s potential experience in the labor market as
years elapsed after schooling and then estimate how one extra year of experience within a job
(firm-worker match) affects wage growth for workers in different lifecycle stages measured
by potential experience. In principle, one more year of experience and changes in aggregate
time effects can both lead to wage changes. To resolve this well-known collinearity problem
(Deaton 1997), we apply the broadly used Heckman–Lochner–Taber (HLT) approach (e.g.,
Heckman et al. 1998, Huggett et al. 2011, Bowlus and Robinson 2012, Lagakos et al. 2018).
The centerpiece of this approach is to assume no experience returns in the end of the working
life,3 and hence old workers’ wage growth allows us to isolate time effects.
We document three facts. First, for a person staying in a job for 20 years from the
beginning of her career, her wage growth is 85% at non-exporters and 104% at exporters,
indicating a sizeable difference of 19 percentage points in lifecycle wage growth between ex-
porters and non-exporters. Second, firm productivity proxies and firm fixed effects explain
1For more evidence on the comparison of productivity levels between exporters and non-exporters, see
also Bernard and Jensen (1999), Aw et al. (2000), Van Biesebroeck (2005), Lileeva and Trefler (2010), Aw
et al. (2011), and De Loecker (2013), among others.
2Herkenhoff et al. (2018) and Jarosch et al. (2018) study the effects of exposure to coworkers, and Gregory
(2019) explores the impact of firm-specific human capital accumulation.
3A large number of theories of lifecycle wage growth find that there are little returns to experience in
the final working years (Rubinstein and Weiss 2006).
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most of the differences in experience-wage profiles between exporters and non-exporters,
hinting that exporters essentially provide higher returns to experience. Third, after control-
ling for productivity proxies, labor composition, and firm fixed effects, returns to experience
are still higher when firms export to high-income destinations. We find that the increase
in returns to experience materializes immediately following firms’ entry into high-income
destinations, and this result is robust when we apply the propensity-matching approach to
lessen the endogeneity concern of export decisions.
We show our empirical results do not rely on the HLT approach. For workers who have
been observed since a young age, instead of using age and schooling to construct potential
experience, we construct experience based on their observed employment history. Because
of possible breaks in observed employment records (due to reasons such as unemployment),
which resolve the collinearity between experience and time, we thus do not need to impose
the HLT assumption in estimation. Using this sample, we still find that previous experience
at exporters (especially those who export to high-income destinations) is more valuable than
experience at non-exporters, and that these experience effects persist after switching firms.
The estimated experience effects are of similar magnitude to our previous findings. We also
show similar results for a sample of displaced workers due to sudden closure of large firms,
as these workers’ returns to previous experience are more likely to be shaped by learning
than seniority (Jacobson et al. 1993, Dustmann and Meghir 2005).
The impact of export activity on wage profiles can reflect human capital accumulation as
well as changes in firm-worker rent sharing, as suggested by a large literature quantitatively
studying the earnings dynamics (e.g., Bunzel et al. 1999, Rubinstein and Weiss 2006, Barlevy
2008, Yamaguchi 2010, Burdett et al. 2011, Bowlus and Liu 2013, Bagger et al. 2014, Gregory
2019). The second contribution of this paper is to develop and quantify a model with firms’
export market entry, wage renegotiations, and human capital accumulation to interpret the
data and conduct experiments.
Our model builds on Cahuc et al. (2006), in which firms post vacancies and meet workers
by random search, and wages can be renegotiated when workers are poached by other firms.
Guided by our evidence, we embed two novel features into the model. First, we consider
that the increment in human capital per time spent increases with firm productivity and
the sales-weighted average knowledge stock in firms’ markets.4 Thus, staying in highly
productive firms (which tend to select into exporting) and being exposed to destinations
4Modelling the dependence of learning returns on firm productivity is also used by Monge-Naranjo (2016)
and Engbom (2020), but they do not consider that human capital gains depend on firms’ product markets.
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with affluent knowledge can produce faster human capital growth. Second, we consider
destinations to be heterogeneous in their levels of knowledge stock, and therefore different
combinations of destinations imply vastly different learning opportunities for workers.5
In the model, workers’ within-job wage profiles reflect human capital growth, changes in
time allocated to human capital investment, and wage renegotiations. To understand their
relative contributions, we calibrate our model to the Brazilian manufacturing sector and
target the relevant moments to discipline the strength of wage renegotiations and human
capital investment. In the calibrated model, human capital growth can explain 70% of
the overall within-job wage profiles. However, because of diminishing returns to human
capital investment, human capital growth can only explain 40% of differences in wage profiles
between exporters and non-exporters as well as the gains in experience returns after entry
into high-income destinations. Our calibrated model is also capable to match the observed
decline in experience returns after entry into non-high-income destinations.
We then use our calibrated model to understand the quantitative effects of trade openness.
In the first counterfactual exercise, we find that the gain in real income from autarky to
the calibrated economy is 9.50%. A large contributor is faster human capital growth with
exposure to high-income destinations—workers enjoy a 4.86% increase in average efficiency
labor due to trade openness. In the second exercise, we lower trade costs from Brazil to
specific export destinations. The gains in real income depend on destinations’ knowledge
stock and are not necessarily positive. Lowering trade costs to high-income destinations by
10% would increase Brazil’s real income by 2.70%, largely due to a 2.12% increase in workers’
average human capital. Surprisingly, lowering trade costs to non-high-income destinations
by 10% would reduce Brazil’s real income by 0.21%, mainly driven by a 0.73% decline
in workers’ average human capital. In the third exercise, we find that higher knowledge
stocks from trade partners would increase Brazil’s real income through changes in workers’
human capital. Finally, we show that assuming learning-by-doing (exogenous human capital
processes) instead of endogenous human capital investment would amplify the gains in human
capital from trade, because with no changes in time allocated to human capital accumulation,
costless human capital growth plays a larger role in explaining the wage profiles.
This paper relates to several strands of the literature. We directly contribute to the
5This setting is also in contrast with papers that incorporate trade into similar models with labor hiring
constraints (e.g., Fajgelbaum 2019, Dix-Carneiro et al. 2019), which typically model an aggregated rest of
world. Modelling multiple destinations implies a hard permutation problem for deciding the set of export
destinations from all feasible combinations, as firms’ selling decisions are interdependent across markets in
such models, and is thus computationally demanding.
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literature on learning by exporting. Recent papers show that through acquiring new knowl-
edge from exporting, firms can improve their technical efficiency (Aw et al. 2000, De Loecker
2013, Atkin et al. 2017) or understanding of export demand (Albornoz et al. 2012, Morales
et al. 2019). Few studies explore how workers may also acquire knowledge from exporting.
Exceptions are Mion and Opromolla (2014) and Muendler and Rauch (2018) who find that
employees’ previous experience at exporters is valuable for their new employers’ choices of
export markets. In contrast with these studies, we look into how export activity affects
workers’ lifecycle wage growth within the firm. Our results indicate that exporting may
enhance workers’ human capital, especially with exposure to advanced export destinations.
We also make contact with research on lifecycle wage growth. The literature has proposed
many factors affecting lifecycle wage growth, such as job search (Bagger et al. 2014), hu-
man capital accumulation (Manuelli and Seshadri 2014), industry composition (Dix-Carneiro
2014), and match quality (Menzio et al. 2016).6 To our knowledge, our study is the first
to explore the role of a firm’s export activity in shaping its workers’ wage profiles. More-
over, much empirical work finds wage differences between exporters and non-exporters but
abstracts from experience returns (e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1995).7 We show that the ex-
porter wage premium increases with workers’ experience. Finally, recent studies highlight
the importance of lifecycle wage growth in accounting for cross-country income differences
(Islam et al. 2018, Lagakos et al. 2018). Our results imply that incentivizing exporting to
high-income may reduce the cross-country income gap.
Our paper is also related to the literature that uses quantitative trade models with labor
market search frictions (e.g., Helpman and Itskhoki 2010, Cosar et al. 2016, Dix-Carneiro
et al. 2019, Fajgelbaum 2019). The most related paper is Fajgelbaum (2019) who also builds
on the model of labor search and wage renegotiations in Cahuc et al. (2006). Fajgelbaum
(2019) focuses on the interaction between labor market frictions and firm export decisions,
and his model abstracts from human capital and workers’ lifecycle. In contrast, our analysis
focuses on the impact of export activity on workers’ wage dynamics and thus embeds a rich
modelling of workers’ human capital accumulation and lifecycle choices.
Finally, we connect with a large literature on international knowledge diffusion. Many
studies use macro aggregates (e.g., output, TFP, and R&D) to empirically study international
6Islam et al. (2018) show how a lot of factors, such as sectors, occupations, and Internet penetration,
determine returns to experience.
7The literature finds that the exporter wage premium is composed of differences in labor composition
and wage premia for workers with identical characteristics, including Schank et al. (2007), Frias et al. (2009),
and Krishna et al. (2014). These existing studies abstract from workers’ experience returns.
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knowledge diffusion (e.g., Coe and Helpman 1995, Eaton and Kortum 1999), as reviewed by
Keller (2021), highlighting that good economic performance of outward-oriented economies
is particularly due to knowledge spillovers from foreign countries. Recent theoretical papers
also explore the relation between trade-induced knowledge diffusion and firm productivity
growth (e.g., Alvarez et al. 2013, Perla et al. 2015, Sampson 2016, Buera and Oberfield
2020).8 This literature links trade with knowledge diffusion, whereas our results highlight
that workers’ human capital accumulation may also reflect trade-induced knowledge flows.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical findings on export
activity and experience-wage profiles, and highlights the interaction between wage profiles
and destination markets. To understand the facts and perform the quantitative analysis,
Section 3 develops a small-country model with export activity, wage renegotiations, and
human capital accumulation. Section 4 calibrates the model to match the data moments, and
Section 5 performs several counterfactual exercises to understand the role of trade openness
in affecting human capital and real income. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experience-Wage Profiles and Exporting
In this section, we document a set of stylized facts on how export activity affects experience-
wage profiles in Brazil. We show that experience-wage profiles are steeper at exporters than
non-exporters. We then show that higher experience-wage profiles at exporters reflect both
selection of more capable firms into exporting and the effects of entering more advanced
export destinations.
2.1 Data
Brazil constitutes a good case study for several reasons. First, Brazil has great data avail-
ability, as described below. Second, Brazilian exporters sell to a wide range of destinations,
allowing the exploration of how export destinations shape wage profiles. For example, in
2010, Brazil’s exports were not only directed to high-income countries (10% of total exports
to the U.S., 25% to Europe, and 4% to Japan), but also to middle- and low-income countries
(23% to Latin America, 15% to China, and 10% to Middle East and Africa). Appendix A.1
describes details of the Brazilian economy and exports during our sample period.
We rely on the RAIS database between 1994–2010. It provides a complete depiction of
8See Lind and Ramondo (2019) for a review.
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workers employed in the Brazilian formal sector, because firms are mandated (by law) to
annually provide workers’ information to RAIS (Menezes-Filho et al. 2008).9 Each datapoint
represents a worker-firm-year observation, containing worker ID, firm ID, and workers’ in-
formation on schooling, age, hourly wage, occupation, and other demographic information.
One limitation of the data is the absence of information about the informal sector. Appendix
A.2 discusses the characteristics of the Brazilian informal sector and shows that including
informal workers in the sample may strengthen our empirical results.
We restrict our empirical analysis to manufacturing firms, which are tradable and ex-
tensively studied. In addition, we focus on full-time male workers aged between 18–65 and
employed at firms with at least 10 employees.10 If a worker has multiple records in a year,
we select the record with the highest hourly wage (Dix-Carneiro 2014). Under these restric-
tions, we obtain a sample of 72 million observations in the period 1994–2010, including 17
million unique worker IDs and 229 thousand unique firm IDs. We also provide details on
the industry and occupation classification of the database in Appendix B.
We use firm IDs to merge the RAIS data with Brazilian customs declarations for mer-
chandise exports collected at SECEX for the years 1994–2010. We define a firm as an
exporter in a given year if the firm has export transactions in that year. The SECEX data
provides which destinations and 8-digit products each firm export in each year, whereas for
1997–2000, the data also provides information on detailed export quantity and value (U.S.$).
Table 1 describes characterizations of the RAIS database, based on worker-firm-year
observations. On average, relative to non-exporters, workers at exporters are slightly older
and more educated, and earn higher hourly wages. Workers at exporters also tend to work
in cognitive occupations (professionals, technicians, and other white-collar jobs). Moreover,
exporters are much larger in terms of employment than non-exporters. These pieces of
evidence are consistent with the exporter premium typically found in the literature (e.g.,
Bernard et al. 2003, Verhoogen 2008). Finally, 49% of worker-firm-year observations are at
exporters, and thus export activity is nontrivial in our sample.
9The ministry of labor estimates that above 90% of formally employed workers in Brazil were covered
by RAIS throughout the 1990s. The data collection is typically concluded by March following the year
of observation (Menezes-Filho et al. 2008). One benefit of this data is that the reports are substantially
accurate. This accuracy stems from the fact that workers’ public wage supplements rely on the RAIS
information, which encourages workers to check if information is reported correctly by their employers.
10The restrictions on full-time male workers follow Lagakos et al. (2018), due to large changes in female
labor participation rates. According to the World Bank’s estimates for those aged 15+ in Brazil, female labor
force participation rate increased from 45% in 1994 to 54% in 2010, whereas male labor force participation
rate changed from 81% to 77% in the meantime. The restriction on firm size aims to avoid self-employment.
The results are quantitatively similar if we restrict the employment size to be at least 5.
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Table 1: Sample Statistics
Observations (72 million) Non-exporter Exporter
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
workers’ characteristics:
age 31.97 9.72 32.78 9.39
schooling 8.23 3.46 9.06 3.77
log(hourly wage), Brazilian Real$ 0.67 0.77 1.20 0.96
cognitive occupations (1 if yes) 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.43
share of workers in the sample 0.51 – 0.49 –
firms’ characteristics:
log(employment) 4.51 1.56 7.05 1.71
log(exports per worker), U.S.$ – – 8.09 2.31
Note: We adjust log(hourly wage) for inflation using 1994 as the baseline year. Cognitive
occupations refer to professionals, technicians, and other white-collar workers. Firm employment
size is computed based on all workers within the firm in the raw sample (including female and
part-time workers) to reflect actual firm size. The export value data is only available in 1997–
2000, and hence log(exports per worker) is based on these four years.
In Appendix B.1, we use the raw data to present experience-wage profiles in the cross
section, showing that workers at exporters have steeper wage profiles than workers at non-
exporters.11 As there are many identification problems with this first-pass attempt, we
proceed to formally estimate experience-wage profiles.
2.2 Aggregate Experience-Wage Profiles by Export Status
Method. We consider a job as a firm-worker match and estimate experience-wage profiles
using workers’ within-job wage growth, following Bagger et al. (2014). In comparison with
using wage levels to estimate experience returns (Islam et al. 2018, Lagakos et al. 2018), this
approach takes advantage of the panel structure of our employer-employee data, controlling
for individual, firm, and match-specific fixed effects that affect wage levels and avoiding the
“incidental parameters” issue of estimating too many fixed effects (Arellano and Hahn 2007).
Another strength of focusing on within-job wage growth is that it avoids potential wage






it + (γst − γst−1) + ǫit, (1)
11We also find similar results as in the literature (Islam et al. 2018, Lagakos et al. 2018): more-educated
workers, workers in bigger firms, and workers in more sophisticated occupations have steeper wage profiles.
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where i and t represent individuals and years respectively. The subscript s is the level of
aggregation for estimating experience returns (e.g., exporters and non-exporters), which will
be specified in later implementation. ∆ log(wit) denotes within-job wage growth, which is
log hourly wage growth from t− 1 to t for individual i within the same firm.12
As we cannot observe all workers’ full employment history, we follow Lagakos et al.
(2018) to construct a measure of potential experience in the labor market as the minimum
of age minus 18 or age minus 6 and schooling, min{age-18,age-6-schooling}. Dxit is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if a worker’s current potential experience is in experience
bin x ∈X = {1–5,6–10,...}, where X is the set of 5-year experience bins. The parameter
φxs measures returns to one extra year of experience for workers in experience bin x, and
thus we allow experience returns to nonparametrically differ across stages of the lifecycle
(measured by experience bin x), because experience returns change as workers grow old.13
γst represents time effects on wage levels at time t (e.g., TFP, price levels).
Estimating equation (1) faces the well-known collinearity problem regarding experience,





it = 1 is perfectly correlated with the constant (γst − γst−1) for each aggregation
level s and time t. Intuitively, entering a new year amounts to one more year of experience
according to construction of potential experience, and wage growth over time can be induced
by experience or better aggregate economic conditions (e.g., TFP growth). To disentangle
returns to experience from aggregate trends, we adopt the HLT method used broadly in the
literature (e.g., Huggett et al. 2011, Bowlus and Robinson 2012, Lagakos et al. 2018).14 This
approach introduces a restriction on experience returns, drawing on the basic prediction of
a large number of theories of lifecycle wage growth that there are little experience returns in
the final working years, and hence workers’ wage growth in the final working years reflects
time effects.15 Implementing the HLT approach requires assumptions on two parameters: the
number of years with no experience returns, and the depreciation rate. Following Lagakos
et al. (2018), we consider 10 years at the end of the working life (31–40 years of experience)
with no experience returns and a 0% depreciation rate, and these two parameters imply the
restriction φ31−35s + φ
36−40
s = 0. Appendix C.1 provides more details on the approach.
12As the time effects γst − γst−1 depend on the aggregation level s (e.g., exporters and non-exporters),
we also require the corresponding firm status to remain constant from t− 1 to t.
13Another common way to model experience returns is to assume a quadratic functional form (e.g.,
De La Roca and Puga 2017).
14See Lagakos et al. (2018) for a detailed description of the method.
15See Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) for a review of theories on lifecycle wage growth.
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Figure 1: Log Hourly Wage Increase by Exporters and Non-exporters
Note: This figure presents the (employment-weighted) within-industry experience-wage profiles for workers
at exporters and non-exporters, from estimating equation (1) using the Brazilian data between 1994–2010.
We assume the final 10 years with no experience returns.
Estimation Results. We apply equation (1) to estimate experience-wage profiles using
our sample. As returns to experience may differ across industries (Dix-Carneiro 2014), we
always control for industry effects when comparing wage profiles between exporters and non-
exporters.16 Figure 1 presents the estimated experience-wage profiles at exporters and non-
exporters. For a hypothetical person staying in a job for 20 years from the beginning of their
career, her wage growth is 19 percentage points higher at exporters than at non-exporters,
and the difference slightly declines to 14 percentage points after 40 years of experience.
In Appendix Figure E.1, we show that the differences in wage profiles between exporters
and non-exporters are quantitatively very similar if we assume the final 5 years with no
experience returns. An alternative value of depreciation shifts exporters’ and non-exporters’
wage profiles by the same amount and thus does not affect relative differences in wage
profiles between exporters and non-exporters. Because depreciation rates can matter for the
aggregate amount of human capital, we will calibrate and discuss the depreciation of human
capital in the quantitative analysis.
16Specially, we estimate equation (1) separately for Brazilian workers within exporters and non-exporters,
for each 3-digit industry. We then apply identical weights (total industry-level employment) to construct
profiles for exporters and non-exporters. Consistently, we always control industry fixed effects in our firm-
level regressions below.
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2.3 Firm-level Wage Profiles and Export Destinations
To understand what drives differences in experience returns between exporters and non-






it + (γωt − γωt−1) + ǫit, (2)
where ω refers to a firm. The returns to experience φxωt are now firm-specific and also time-
variant to allow exploration of changes in firms’ export status, as described below. This
equation involves a large number of firm-specific parameters and usually requires grouping
firms into several groups for estimation (Bonhomme et al. 2018). To exploit the firm-level
information, instead of directly estimating equation (2), we make use of the same assumption
of the HLT method that there are no experience returns for workers in the last 10 years of
the working life, φ31−35ωt + φ
36−40
ωt = 0. Based on this assumption, the wage growth of the
last two experience bins reflects the firm-specific wage trend (γωt − γωt−1). Hence, we can






































represents the average individual-level log wage growth between t− 1 and t,
for workers at firm ω in both periods and in experience bin x ∈ X = {1–5,...,36–40}. By
equation (3), we control for time-varying conditions (e.g., TFP growth, demand shocks) that
alter wages for all workers within the firm. For instance, if the firm raises all workers’ wage
by the same proportion due to increased revenue after exporting, this effect will not show
up in equation (3). However, if the wage growth is relatively higher for young workers than
old workers, this relative difference will be interpreted as returns to experience.17
In Table 2, we regress firm-year-level returns to 20 years of experience on firm charac-
teristics. The dependent variable is 5 ×∑x∈{1−5,...,16−20} φxω,t, measuring the hypothetical
lifecycle wage growth of a worker staying at firm ω for 20 years from the beginning of their
career, with returns to experience fixed at time t. We choose to report returns to 20 years of
experience, because many firms do not have workers in all experience bins and workers have
17Besides estimating firm-level wage profiles, the main difference from the method in Section 2.2 is that
the previous method estimates average experience returns over time and only requires average experience
returns in the last ten years to be zero. If we also estimate time-variant experience returns φxst in Section
2.2 and restrict φ31−35st + φ
36−40
st = 0 at each time t, we can then obtain φ
x
st similarly as in equation (3).
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Table 2: Wage Profiles and Firm Characteristics
Dep Var: Firm-year-level Returns to 20 Yrs of Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample period 94–10 94–10 94–10 97–00 97–00 97–00
Exporter 0.278*** 0.018 -0.016 -0.050 -0.082 -0.050
(0.013) (0.026) (0.035) (0.073) (0.127) (0.125)
Exporter × ratio of
# high-income to # total dests
0.134*** 0.237**
(0.052) (0.110)
Exporter × share of









-0.010 0.038 0.026 0.026
(0.020) (0.053) (0.060) (0.060)
Exporter ×
log(avg exports per employee)
0.010 0.008
(0.030) (0.022)
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 344,785 344,785 344,785 77,888 77,888 77,888
R-squared 0.007 0.318 0.318 0.488 0.488 0.488
Note: This table presents estimates from regressions of firm-year-level returns to 20 years of experience on firm character-
istics. The baseline group is non-exporters. The controls are the shares of high-school and cognitive workers in the firm’s
workforce as well as firm size. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
little returns to experience after 20 years of experience (Figure 1).
In Column (1), the independent variables are an exporter dummy (1 if a firm exports)
and a set of industry and year fixed effects. The baseline group is non-exporters. We find
that after 20 years of experience, workers’ wage increase is 27 percentage points higher at
exporters than at non-exporters, which is comparable in magnitude to the difference found
earlier (Figure 1)—19 percentage points after 20 years of experience.18
In Column (2), we control for the shares of high-school and cognitive workers in the firm’s
workforce, as labor composition can affect wage profiles (Islam et al. 2018). We further
control for firm employment size, which is associated with firm productivity (Hopenhayn
1992), and firm fixed effects, capturing time-invariant unobserved factors. Surprisingly,
18The employment-weighted difference in returns to 20 years of experience between exporters and non-
exporters is 18 percentage points. This aligns with the result in Figure 1, which is estimated using worker-level
information and naturally puts higher weight on wage profiles at firms with larger employment size.
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after including these controls, the resulting exporters’ premium in returns to experience
declines (relative to Column (1)) and nearly vanishes. We find that only controlling for labor
composition explains 19% of the decline in the exporters’ premium, whereas only controlling
for firm employment explains 60% of the decline. These results suggest that higher returns
to experience at exporters reflect selection of better firms into exporting.
We explore the dependence of wage profiles on export destinations in Columns (3)–(6).
In Column (3), for each exporter in each year, we include the ratio of the number of high-
income destinations to the total number of export destinations. We classify countries into
high-income countries according to the World Bank classification in 2000.19 We also control
for the number of export destinations, as the scope of destinations may matter. We find that
firms that export more to high-income destinations also experience steeper wage profiles. The
coefficient suggests that other things being constant, a firm exporting solely to high-income
countries has a 13-percentage-point higher returns to 20 years of experience than an exporter
that does not sell any output to high-income countries.
In Columns (4)–(6), we exploit firm-level detailed data on export value for the 1997–2000
period. Column (4) replicates the regression of Column (3) for 1997–2000. We still find that
exporting to high-income countries increases wage profiles in 1997–2000, though the coeffi-
cients become noisier due to a smaller sample size. In Column (5), we measure an exporter’s
exposure to high-income countries by the share of exports to high-income destinations in its
total exports. We also control for export value per employee, as destination-specific effects
may originate from increased revenue due to exporting. In line with previous results, larger
shares of exports to high-income destinations significantly increase returns to experience. We
also find that controlling for export value per employee has little effects on the coefficients.
In Column (6), we measure a firm’s destination-specific exposure by using export-weighted
GDP per capita across export destinations.20 We find that exporting to destinations with
higher income significantly increases returns to experience.
In Appendix Table D.1, we replicate the results in Table 2 after controlling for duration
of workers’ previous experience at exporters and duration of the firm’s previous export par-
ticipation, as well as these durations related to high-income destinations. The coefficients of
interest barely change, suggesting that our findings are not driven by working with experi-
19In 2000, the World Bank classifies countries into high-income countries if their GNI per capita is higher
than $9,265. To avoid that our results are affected by reshuffling of countries around the margin, we still use
our list of high-income countries in 2000 when we compute the results for other years.
20To avoid that our results are driven by time trends of GDP per capita, we use each country’s GDP per
capita in 2000 to compute firms’ export-weighted GDP per capita across export destinations in 1997–2000.
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enced managers and coworkers (Mion and Opromolla 2014, Muendler and Rauch 2018).
In Appendix Table D.2, we divide industries into differentiated and non-differentiated
industries.21 We show that differentiated industries enjoy large and significant increases in
returns to experience due to high-income destinations, even after controlling for export value,
whereas non-differentiated industries have insignificant and small changes in returns due to
destinations. This indicates that our finding may be partly driven by workers’ human capital
accumulation, as differentiated products tend to be associated with larger scope of workers’
learning opportunities.22 Our main analysis focuses on manufacturing, whereas Brazil also
exports agricultural and mining products (see Appendix A.1). Appendix Table D.2 reports
that there are no significant experience effects of export destinations on agricultural and
mining firms, whose products tend to be more homogeneous with little scope of learning.
Before providing a quantitative analysis of possible causes of experience effects, we now
show more supportive evidence that changes in returns to experience related to high-income
destinations are caused by export activity.
2.4 Changes in Profiles around Entry to High-income Destinations
We first construct an event study to show that changes in returns to experience related to

















ω,tb+ θω + ψj(ω,t) + δt + ǫω,t.
(4)
As before, the dependent variable yω,t is firm-year-level returns to 20 years of experience. We
still control for firm fixed effects θω, industry effects ψj(ω,t), and year effects δt. Firm-level
controls Xω,t include the shares of high-school and cognitive workers, firm size, and a dummy
variable indicating whether the firm is exporting to a non-high-income destination.
21Using the firm-product-level export value in 1997–2000, we define a 3-digit industry to be differentiated
if its share of differentiated-product exports in total exports lies above the median across all manufacturing
industries, according to the classification of 4-digit SITC products in Rauch (1999).
22For example, as Artopoulos et al. (2010) note in Latin America, “successfully entering markets in de-
veloped economies with differentiated products requires potential exporters to make substantial efforts to
upgrade the physical characteristics of their products and to make their marketing practices more sophisti-
cated” (p. 6).
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Figure 2: Dynamics of Firms’ First Entry Into High-income Destinations
Note: The figure shows the βτ parameters from estimating equation (4). The dependent variable is firm-year-level returns to
20 years of experience. The regression controls for firm fixed effects, industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, the shares of
high-school graduates and cognitive workers in the workforce, firm size, and a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is
exporting to a non-high-income destination. To estimate the βτ parameters after entry, we require that firms remain exporting
to high-income destinations.
The βτ parameters of primary interest are coefficients on indicators for time periods
relative to the firm’s first export entry into high-income destinations at time t = t∗ (τ = 0).
We exclude an indicator for the period immediately before the firm’s export entry, and
hence the parameters represent changes in returns to experience relative to the period before
entry into high-income destinations. The coefficients are identified by firms starting as non-
exporters or exporters only to non-high-income destinations and then turning to export to
high-income destinations in our sample period. Thus, in the analysis, we focus on firms that
do not start as exporters to high-income destinations when they make first appearance in
the sample. For the βτ parameters after entry, we also require that firms remain exporting to
high-income destinations, and therefore βτ (for τ > 0) is interpreted as changes in returns to
experience for a firm that exports to high-income destinations in τ periods after first entry.
Figure 2 presents the results from estimating equation (4). After first entry into high-
income destinations, firms’ returns to experience significantly increase by 20 percentage
points, whereas experience-wage profiles do not significantly shift before firms’ export entry.
In addition, the increase in returns to experience stays roughly constant after entry, indicating
that exporting to high-income destinations is associated with persistently higher returns to
experience. Appendix Figure E.2 estimates the βτ parameters for the firm’s first export entry
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Table 3: Returns to 20 Yrs of Experience for New Exporters to High-income Destinations
Post-exporting period 0 1 2 3
(a) Outcome: returns to experience
Export entry 0.139* 0.177* 0.344*** 0.249*
(0.073) (0.095) (0.119) (0.138)
Nr treated 4,164 2,191 1,693 1,477
Nr controls 158,734 118,285 93,056 75,150
(b) Outcome: growth in returns (relative to τ = −1 period)
Export entry 0.214** 0.251* 0.065 0.383**
(0.110) (0.141) (0.187) (0.193)
Notes: The table reports the difference of returns to experience and growth in returns (relative to τ = −1 period) between
new exporters and non-exporters. The propensity score is estimated based on a Probit model, including a host of pre-
exporting (previous year) firm characteristics—returns to 20 years of experience, the shares of high-school and cognitive
workers, firm size, and export status to non-high-income destinations, as well as industry and year fixed effects. The
number of the treated and the control units on the common support decreases as there are fewer firms with future returns
to experience. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
into non-high-income destinations at time t = t∗ (τ = 0). We find no statistically significant
change in returns to experience after entry to non-high-income destinations.
To control for the self-selection process of exporting, we apply the propensity-score match-
ing estimator as suggested by Heckman et al. (1997) (see Appendix C.2 for details on the
approach).23 We first estimate each firm’s probability to start to export to high-income
destinations based on a Probit model. We include a host of pre-exporting (previous year)
firm characteristics, including returns to 20 years of experience, the shares of high-school
and cognitive workers, firm size, and export status to non-high-income destinations, as well
as industry and year fixed effects. The matching is based on the method of the nearest
neighbor,24 which selects a non-exporting firm which has a propensity score closest to that
of the export entrant. We find that the first moments of the covariates are not different for
the treated and the control units (balancing hypothesis, see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984)).
Panel (a) of Table 3 reports the difference in the level of returns to experience between
new exporters and non-exporters, and Panel (b) presents the difference in growth of re-
turns (relative to τ = −1 period) between new exporters and non-exporters, which can be
interpreted as a DID estimator. These estimators are constructed in the same way as in
De Loecker (2007). We report the differences in the period of export entry (τ = 0) and
23Previous studies have used the matching estimator to estimate the causal effects of exporting on produc-
tivity, such as Wagner (2002), Girma et al. (2003), De Loecker (2007), Konings and Vandenbussche (2008),
and Ma et al. (2014).
24We also experiment with kernel matching or one-to-one Mahalanobis matching. We still find quantita-
tively similar results: exporting to high-income countries increases returns to experience.
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up to 3 periods after export entry for firms that remain exporting. Our results show that
exporting to high-income destinations causes an increase in returns to experience. Most of
the estimated increases in returns to 20 years of experience are significant and at around 20
percentage points, similar to our estimates in Table 2 and Figure 2.
In Appendix Table D.3, we find no significant differences in the shares of high-school and
cognitive workers between new exporters and non-exporters in the period of export entry.
This indicates that changes in labor composition may not explain increases in returns to
experience because of export entry. The subsection below explores worker-level regressions
to further confirm that our results are not driven by changes in labor composition after entry.
Appendix Table D.4 reports future effects for new exporters that stop exporting in future
periods. Increases in returns to experience become much smaller after firms stop exporting,
and the statistical significance almost vanishes. This suggests that large increases in returns
to experience are associated with continuing exporting to high-income destinations, and
there can exist some persistent effects after stopping exporting. Finally, Appendix Table
D.5 replicates Table 3 for entry to non-high-income destinations, and we find no statistically
significant changes in returns to experience after export entry.
2.5 Worker-level Results
In Appendix C.3, we construct a panel of young workers that enter RAIS under 25 years old
(arguably the beginning of the career).25 Using this restricted sample has several strengths.
First, instead of constructing potential experience based on age and schooling, we can now
construct these young people’s experience using their observed employment history in RAIS.
Second, because of possible breaks in employment history due to reasons such as unemploy-
ment (thus entering a new year does not necessarily imply one more year of experience),
their observed experience does not have the collinearity problem with year effects. Thus, we
no longer require the HLT approach in estimation.
We perform panel regression to estimate how workers’ previous work experience affects
their current wages, controlling for individual fixed effects and time effects. In comparison
with previous subsections, here we do not restrict workers’ wage growth to be within a job
in order to understand how experience affects wages after switching firms. We have three
findings. First, we find that if a new worker starts a job at exporters, she enjoys a 4.8% wage
premium relative to a job at non-exporters. If she continues to work at exporters, she enjoys
25To extend the work history, we supplement our sample in 1994–2010 with RAIS and customs data in
1986–1993, for which we do not observe hourly wage but can construct workers’ experience.
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a 16.5% higher wage growth than working at non-exporters over 20 years of experience, in
line with the results in Section 2.2. Second, we find that the experience effects persist after
switching firms. According to the estimates, if a worker starts to work in a new firm after 20
years of experience in an exporter, she enjoys a 10.5% higher wage than previously working
at non-exporters for 20 years. Finally, we find that if a worker accumulates 20 years of
experience at exporters from the beginning of the career, working at exporters that only
export to high-income destinations would lead to a 15% higher wage growth than working
at exporters that only export to non-high-income destinations. This result is of similar
magnitude as our firm-level results in Table 2.
We further analyze a sample of displaced workers due to closure of large firms, because,
after displacement, these workers’ returns to previous experience are more likely to be shaped
by learning than seniority, following the labor literature (Jacobson et al. 1993, Dustmann
and Meghir 2005, Arellano-Bover and Saltiel 2021). We still find that previous experience
at exporters is more valuable for their post-displacement earnings than experience at non-
exporters. In particular, if a worker has accumulated 20 years of experience at exporters
before displacement, previously working at exporters that only export to high-income des-
tinations would lead to 15% higher post-displacement earnings than previously working at
exporters that only export to non-high-income destinations. This finding is of similar mag-
nitude to the results from the full sample of all young workers.
3 Model
To understand the factors behind the impact of export activity on wage profiles and its
aggregate implications, we proceed to develop and quantity a model. As suggested by our
evidence and a large literature on the earnings dynamics (e.g., Bunzel et al. 1999, Rubinstein
and Weiss 2006, Barlevy 2008, Yamaguchi 2010, Burdett et al. 2011, Bowlus and Liu 2013,
Bagger et al. 2014, Gregory 2019), we consider that wage profiles reflect human capital
accumulation as well as changes in firm-worker rent sharing.
In the model, firms meet unemployed or employed workers by random search and decide
whether to sell in foreign markets. Workers’ within-job wage grows due to endogenous
human capital accumulation and wage renegotiations. The increment in human capital per
time spent depends on the knowledge stock of destination markets, and different destinations
are heterogeneous in their knowledge stocks. We focus on a steady state in which aggregate
variables are constant. The timing of events in each period is provided in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Timing of Events in Each Period
Workers of Age 1 Enter
Firms Randomly Separate
from Current Workers






Increase Human Capital and
Workers of Age T Retire
3.1 Workers, Labor Market Frictions, and Human Capital
There is a unit mass of overlapping generations of workers, with totally T cohorts. Workers
participate in the labor market from age t = 1, 2, .., T . A fraction 1/T of workers of age T
retire each period and are replaced by new entrants. Thus, the measure of workers in each
age group is 1/T . Workers have the linear utility for consumption of a nontradable final
good, and they discount the future at rate ρ. The final good is aggregated over a set of
differentiated varieties sourced from domestic or foreign origins, as we describe below.
Labor markets are subject to search frictions (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Pissarides
2000). At the beginning of each period, existing jobs are terminated at an exogenous rate κ.
New entrants of age 1 begin as unemployed. Unemployed and employed people then learn
of jobs randomly at rates λU and λE respectively. Let U be the total amount of unemployed
people before job search happens, and η be the search efforts of employed people relative to
unemployed people whose search efforts are normalized to 1. The meeting rates λU and λE









of the amount of all firms’ vacancies to workers’ search efforts. The function χ(·) governs
the matching process.
In each period, workers can be employed or unemployed. If employed, workers differ in
their employers and wages. As in Melitz (2003), we consider firms (employers) have different
productivity levels, drawn from a distribution Φ(z). We use productivity z to index firms.
We discuss the wage determination in Section 3.3. Workers also differ in their human capital.
New entrants of age 1 are endowed with human capital normalized to h1 = 1. Employed
workers may accumulate human capital on the job. We assume that workers’ human capital
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evolves as from age t to age t+ 1:
ht+1 = (1− δh)ht + φE(z)iαt . (5)
Here δh is the depreciation rate. The efficiency units of time spent on human capital accu-
mulation, it, are chosen to maximize the joint (firm + worker) value, as described below.
φE(z) captures the increment in human capital per unit of time spent on building skills, and
0 < α < 1 captures the degree of diminishing marginal benefits with time. Guided by our
empirical evidence, the key feature of our model is that given the same amount of time spent







We model the increment as a Cobb-Douglas function of intra-firm knowledge and knowledge
outside the firm, similarly as in Monge-Naranjo (2016), with γ1 and γ2 representing the
elasticities of the increment with regard to intra-firm knowledge and knowledge outside the
firm, respectively. We use firm productivity z to proxy the stock of productive ideas within
the firm. φO(z) summarizes the set of productive ideas that are outside in firms’ markets
and available to workers in the firm. Let sn(z) be the share of sales to destination n in the
firm’s total sales, and λn denote the stock of knowledge gleaned from selling to country n.
Then, φO(z) =
∑
n sn(z)λn is a weighted average of destinations’ knowledge.
The intuition of this learning function is as follows. Workers can grasp knowledge from
their colleagues, through the on-site training, or by learning-by-doing, and these opportuni-
ties are more available at firms with more advanced technology (e.g., Arrow 1962, Jovanovic
and Lach 1989, Hopenhayn and Chari 1991). Directly modelling the dependence of learning
returns on firm productivity captures that better firms provide more learning, and this model
setup is also exploited in recent papers (e.g., Monge-Naranjo 2016, Engbom 2020). Learning
can also happen through interactions with the external environment. For example, firms may
adjust their product requirements for different destination markets (Verhoogen 2008, Manova
and Zhang 2012), and managers can also get new ideas by learning from the local people
they do business with or compete with (Buera and Oberfield 2020). Although the previous
literature mostly focuses on firm productivity26 and has not studied how export destinations
affect workers’ human capital accumulation, it is natural to conjecture that workers’ human
26The idea that trade flows may affect firm productivity dates back to Grossman and Helpman (1991)
and is reviewed by Keller (2004).
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capital accumulation may also be affected by destination-specific product requirements or
personal interactions with clients. Because the share of sales to each destination in a firm’s
total sales proxies the proportion of product lines or employees devoted to that destination,
we thus weight the exposure to destinations’ technology by these sales shares.
3.2 Firm Revenues and the Trade Environment
The production side shares the central features of Melitz (2003). There is a mass M̄ of
monopolistically competitive firms with heterogeneous productivity levels z ∼ Φ(z). Without
loss of generality, we normalize M̄ = 1. Each firm produces a unique differentiated variety
using labor as the only input. Varieties are internationally traded and aggregated into a final
good in each country with a constant elasticity of substitution σ across varieties.
We consider n = 1, 2, ..., N destination markets. In particular, we index the home country
as the first market n = 1, and all other markets refer to foreign economies.27 The small-
open-economy assumption means that aggregate variables in foreign countries are invariant
to conditions at home. Because of monopolistic competition, the quantity demanded for a
variety in market n is yn = p
−σP σn Yn, where Pn and Yn are the aggregate price index and
quantity of the final good in market n, respectively. The price of the variety is determined






n . For firms in the home country, selling to market n incurs iceberg costs τn,
as well as fixed costs fn in terms of final goods in the home market. We assume the iceberg
and fixed costs of selling in the home market to be τ1 = 1 and f1 = 0, respectively.
For a firm with productivity z, producing one unit of good requires 1/z efficiency labor.




final goods. In the quantitative analysis, we assume γv > 0. This assumption generates the
exporter premium, because it is increasingly costly to hire new workers, and thus increased
demand due to exporting leads to larger average revenues for existing workers. Let v(z) be
the optimal amount of vacancies for firm z, as detailed below. The total number of vacancies
is V = M̄
∫
v(z)dΦ(z). We define F (z) =
∫ z
zmin
v(z′)dΦ(z′)/V as the offer distribution.
We can solve the firm z’s revenue, given the total amount of efficiency labor used for
production, h(z), which is determined by the amount of vacancies and employees’ human
capital. For tractability, we assume that the firm maximizes each period’s total revenue
without consideration of the impact of export destinations on workers’ future human capital.
27Differing from papers that model both trade and wage dynamics (e.g., Fajgelbaum 2019, Dix-Carneiro
et al. 2019), we introduce a set of foreign countries instead of one aggregated rest of world, because our
empirical analysis shows that returns to experience depend on specific export destinations.
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n is the revenue if the firm sells yn units of goods in market n, and In(z) ∈ {0, 1}
captures export decisions. P1fn is the value of fixed costs from selling to market n (P1 is the
home-market final-good price). The second equality is the resource constraint, meaning that
the quantities sold (including iceberg costs of transportation) equal the firm’s production.
Given export decisions In(z), we can solve the optimal quantities sold to each destination


































In the case of convex vacancy costs (γv > 0), labor supply is no longer perfectly elastic
at some wage level, and thus firms’ export decisions are interdependent across destination
markets. In total, there are 2N − 1 feasible combinations of destination markets. After
choosing the optimal combination of export markets, the average revenue per efficiency unit
is a(z) = r(z)
h(z)
, which plays the role of labor productivity in our model, similarly as firm
productivity in job search papers that assume one homogeneous good.
3.3 Wage Determination and Job Values
Wages are determined as piece-rate contracts. Consider a worker of age t with human capital
ht, employed at a firm z under a wage contract stipulating a piece rate of 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, which
represents the worker’s share of total revenues and thus measures the degree of firm-worker
rent sharing. If it efficiency units are devoted to human capital accumulation, he or she
receives a wage w = ra(z)(ht − it), where a(z)(ht − it) is the total revenue generated by the
worker. Denote the worker’s value of this match as Vt(r, ht, z) and the joint (worker + firm)
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value as Mt(ht, z). The wage determination follows the generalized Nash bargaining in Dey
and Flinn (2005) and Cahuc et al. (2006), as we now describe.
When the worker employed at current firm z is contacted by a poaching firm z′, the firm
who values the worker the most gets the worker. There are three cases. First, if the poach-
ing firm values the worker more than the current firm, which means that Mt+1(ht+1, z
′) >




′) =Mt+1(ht+1, z) + β (Mt+1(ht+1, z
′)−Mt+1(ht+1, z)) . (10)
The worker obtains the joint value of the match at the current firm plus a share β of the
additional surplus by matching with the poaching firm.
In the second case, the poacher values the worker less than the current firm, but can offer
the worker a wage that delivers a value higher than the worker’s current value. This happens
when Mt+1(ht+1, z
′) < Mt+1(ht+1, z) but Mt+1(ht+1, z
′) > Vt+1(r, ht+1, z). In this case, the
worker stays in the current firm but will renegotiate its wage with the current firm, using
the poacher as the outside option. The new piece rate r′ evolves as:
Vt+1(r
′, ht+1, z) =Mt+1(ht+1, z
′) + β (Mt+1(ht+1, z)−Mt+1(ht+1, z′)) . (11)
The worker can thus extract the full value of the job at the poaching firm plus a share of
the additional surplus by matching with the current firm.
In the third case, if the poacher can not offer the worker a value higher than the worker’s
current value, the worker’s wage does not change.
For an unemployed person who accepts a job from firm z, the starting wage w′ satisfies:
Vt+1(r




Mt+1(ht+1, z)− V Ut+1(ht+1)
)
. (12)
Here V Ut+1(ht+1) is the value of an unemployed worker with human capital ht+1. In the quan-
titative analysis, we follow Bagger et al. (2014) to assume that unemployment is equivalent
to employment in the least productive firm: V Ut+1(ht+1) = Mt+1(ht+1, zmin). This assump-
tion resolves the complication of allowing for heterogeneous reservation wages for workers of
different human capital levels and ages.
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We can also characterize the joint value of a job as follows:


















max{Mt+1(ht+1, z′)−Mt+1(ht+1, z), 0}dF (z′).
(13)
On the right-hand side of the equation, the first line captures the current-period’s production
value. The second line shows the future value if the worker is exogenously separated from the
firm, which happens with a probability κ. In this case, the worker enjoys the unemployment
value and may also get an additional surplus if she can soon find a job. Finally, the last
line captures the future value if an exogenous separation does not happen. In this case, the
match either continues or enjoys an additional surplus if the worker is poached by a firm
that values the worker better.
We assume that the choice of time spent on human capital accumulation follows the
full-competition regime (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999) and maximizes the joint surplus. By










Hence, the optimal time spent on human capital accumulation increases with marginal bene-
fits, which are determined by the increment in human capital φE(z) and the marginal return
of new human capital in production ∂Mt(ht,z)
∂ht+1
.


















max{Mt(ht, z)−Mt(ht, z′), 0}Dt(ht, z′)dhtdΦ(z′).
(15)
Here DUt (ht) is the measure of unemployed workers with human capital ht, and Dt(ht, z)










Dt(ht, z)dhtdΦ(z) = 1−U , which are defined after exogenous
job separations but before job search.
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side captures the marginal costs of posting a vacancy. The right-hand side captures the
aggregate value from hiring unemployed workers and poaching employed workers from other
firms, with (1− β) governing the firm’s share of the increment in surplus from hiring.
3.4 General Equilibrium
The analysis so far focuses on the export activity of firms in the home country. To close the
model, we assume that the home country imports a fixed number M̄ I of varieties with unit
price pI .29 We abstract away from saving, and all the firm profits are spent on final goods.
The balanced trade requires that when the goods market clears, firms’ total export value
equals the total value of imported varieties in the home country.
Now we define the general equilibrium of our model:
Definition 1 The general equilibrium consists of meeting rates {λE, λU} employment distri-
bution {DUt (ht), Dt(ht, z)}, firms’ selling decisions {yn(z), In(z), a(z)} and vacancy posting
v(z), the joint decision of human capital accumulation it(ht, z), and aggregate price and
quantity variables in the home country {P1, Y1}. These variables satisfy:




t (ht) and the
total amount of vacancies V = M̄
∫
v(z)dΦ(z);
(b) employment distributions {DUt (ht), Dt(ht, z)} are consistent with revenues a(z), vacan-
cies v(z), and human capital accumulation it(ht, z);
(c) firms’ selling decisions {yn(z), In(z), a(z)} are given by equation (7), given the amount




Dt(ht, z)(ht− it(ht, z))dht and aggregate price and quantities;
(d) firms’ optimal vacancy postings v(z) are given by equation (15);
(e) the joint decision of human capital accumulation it(ht, z) is given by equation (14); and
(f) aggregate price and quantity {P1, Y1} clear the goods market in the home country.
3.5 Export Activity and Wage Profiles
In the model environment, wages of a worker at firm z can be written as:





















Thus, a worker’s within-job wage growth is:
∆ logw = ∆ log ht
︸ ︷︷ ︸








+ ∆ log a(z)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
changes in labor productivity
+ ∆ log r
︸ ︷︷ ︸
changes in piece rate
(17)
Our model focuses on the steady state and does not incorporate dynamics in export status
and labor revenues, as the model is computationally intractable when firms and workers are
both forward-looking and need to form expectations of firms’ future shocks when making
decisions. When we quantitatively compute gains in experience returns immediately follow-
ing export entry, we use a partial-equilibrium analysis similar to the recent literature (e.g.,
Buera, Kaboski and Yongseok 2021, Buera, Kaboski and Townsend 2021), by implementing
alternative realizations of export costs to each firm in the steady state.
According to equation (17), export activity changes wage profiles within the firm through
three channels. First, export activity affects workers’ human capital increment, by shifting
the mixture of workers’ exposure to destinations’ productive ideas, as shown by equation
(6). If workers’ human capital growth relies on the external environment (γ2 > 0), and the
knowledge stock λn varies across destination markets, then export activity can potentially
produce large effects on workers’ wage profiles through the human capital channel. Second,
as a side effect of changes in human capital investment, workers’ working time also changes.
Finally, export activity can change workers’ bargaining positions in the process of wage
determination. In the model, foreign market access provides firms with opportunities to
expand revenues. Because labor productivity changes are identical for young and old workers
within a firm, they cancel out in our construction of wage profiles. However, increased
revenues offer larger room for the current workers’ wage to grow through wage renegotiations
when poached, especially for young workers who are at the bottom of the job ladder.
A further question is whether the impact of export activity on wage profiles matters for
the aggregate economy. The following proposition characterizes the gains from trade, which
are defined as changes in the real income (domestic firms’ total production value divided by
the final-good price) from autarky to the observed economy.
Proposition 1 If meeting and separation rates λU = 1 and κ = 1, unemployment value
Vt = 0,
30 discount rate ρ is large enough, and vacancy costs are linear γv = 0. The gains
30This assumption can be justified by zmin → 0 or disutility of unemployment (Hornstein et al. 2011),
though in the current model’s quantitative analysis, we abstract from directly modelling the unemployment












changes in average efficiency labor per employee
. (18)
Πd is the home-country expenditure share on domestic goods in the observed economy.
Proof: See Appendix F.2. 
We obtain Proposition 1 under several regularities for analytical tractability. The meeting
and separation rates λU = 1 and κ = 1 ensure full employment and that firms behave like
hiring in a spot market in each period, which resembles the typical assumption in the Melitz
model (Melitz 2003). The assumption of unemployment value Vt = 0 and large discount rate
ρ implies that firms obtain a proportion (1−β) of revenues, and time spent on human capital
accumulation is relatively small. The assumptions of γv = 0 implies that marginal costs of
hiring remain constant, and thus export decisions across destinations are independent.




d reflects the gains due to changes in real income per efficiency labor after trade
openness. This formula is also a well-studied property of gravity equations that arise from a
large number of micro-theoretical foundations with exogenous labor supply (e.g., Arkolakis
et al. 2012, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare 2014).
The second component indicates how trade openness affects the average level of employ-
ees’ efficiency labor. If the impact of export destinations on wage profiles partly reflects
human capital accumulation, the change in human capital of workers at exporters would
produce aggregate welfare effects. Moreover, the typical Melitz force can also reinforce the
gains in employees’ average efficiency labor, as trade induces workers’ reallocation toward
exporters that may benefit workers’ human capital accumulation.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, we abstract from wage renegotiations by letting
all the workers be separated from firms in each period (κ = 1). Wage renegotiations occur in
the more realistic case of κ < 1 and λE > 0, when some workers stay in the firm and derive
outside offers from poachers. We will study the effects of wage renegotiations numerically.
to the employment value in the least productive firm, as discussed in Section 3.3.
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4 Quantification
In this section, we calibrate our model to the Brazilian data. Then, through the lens of our
quantitative model, we explore the determinants of the within-job wage profiles.
4.1 Data
We match the model to summary statistics from the employer-employee data and the customs
data of the Brazilian formal manufacturing sector between 1994–2010. The core variables
that we use are job-to-job transitions and the slope of wages on firm employment size. These
variables are informative of the strength of workers’ bargaining power and on-the-job search,
thus governing the strength of wage renegotiations. Combined with this information, we use
the within-firm wage profiles to inform the magnitude of human capital accumulation.
In our model, because of convex hiring costs, export decisions are interdependent across
destination markets. To decide each firm’s export decisions, we shall compare 2N −1 feasible
combinations of destinations for N markets, which is computationally demanding when N
is large. We thus aggregate all destination markets (other than Brazil) by their continents
and whether they are high-income countries. We obtain N = 10 groups of destinations,
including Brazil, high-income countries in Europe, Asia, North America, and Oceania,31 and
non-high-income countries in Europe, Asia, North America, Africa, and South America.32
4.2 Calibration
To proceed, we must specify the function χ(·) that determines the meeting rates between
unemployed people and firms. It is common to use a Cobb-Douglas job matching function
between searchers and vacancies (e.g., Shimer 2005), which implies χ(x) = cMx
φ , where
0 < φ < 1 is the elasticity of job matches to vacancies. To capture that some small firms
also export, we assume that time-invariant export fixed costs {fn}n=2,...,N follow a log-normal
distribution, log fn ∼ N(log f̄n, σf ), i.i.d. across firms and destinations. Our model abstracts
from firm-level export stocks in each period, because modelling both labor market dynamics
and stochastic changes in firm exports makes the model intractable.33 Finally, it is common
31Africa and South America do not have high-income countries.
32Because non-high-income countries in Oceania accounted for a negligible share (less than 0.01%) of the
Brazilian manufacturing exports in 2000, we omit them in the analysis.
33For example, in this case, the worker also needs to form expectations of firms’ future export status when
making moving decisions, and the firm will also need to take into account workers’ different turnover rates
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in the trade literature (e.g., Chaney 2008) to assume a Pareto productivity distribution
Φ(z) = 1− z−ζ , with a larger shape parameter ζ implying less productivity dispersion.
The calibration must determine the following parameter values: each worker’s lifetime T ,
discount rate ρ, the number of destinations N , the parameters of labor search processes and
wage negotitation {φ, cM , κ, η, β}, human capital depreciation and returns {δh, α, µ, γ1, γ2, λn},
the shape parameter ζ of productivity distribution, the elasticity of substitution across va-
rieties σ, the demand and fixed costs of foreign markets {P σn Ynτ 1−σn , f̄n, σf}n=2,...,N , the con-
stant and curvature of vacancy costs {cv, γv}, and import demand M̄ I(pI)1−σ.
4.2.1 Parameters Set without Solving the Model
Table 4 lists the parameters set without solving the model. We calibrate a model of annual
frequency and set the annual discount rate ρ to 0.04. Each individual works for 40 years,
and therefore we set the total working time to T = 40 years. The number of destination
markets is N = 10 as described above.
We set the elasticity of job matches to vacancies to φ = 0.3 following Shimer (2005)’s
estimate for the US economy, and this parameter value is commonly applied to other countries
in the development literature (e.g., Feng et al. 2018). We follow Manuelli and Seshadri (2014)
to use the depreciation of human capital δh = 0.02 and the convexity in the production of
human capital α = 0.48. We proxy each country’s knowledge stock λn by its GDP per capita
in 2000 and aggregate them into our N = 10 groups of destination markets using Brazil’s
export value as weights. We normalize Brazil’s knowledge stock to 1.
We set the elasticity of substitution across varieties σ = 5, which is the mean value in the
trade literature (Head and Mayer 2014). For the convexity in vacancy costs γv, Dix-Carneiro
et al. (2019) find γv to be 1.1 for Brazilian manufacturing firms.
4.2.2 Parameters Set by Solving the Model
We jointly estimate the remaining 29 parameters (listed in Table 5) to match 29 data mo-
ments on trade, labor market and wage profiles as listed in Table 6. To ensure consistency
between the model-generated data and our empirical analysis, we compute experience re-
turns (returns to 20 years of experience) in the model applying the same HLT method as
discussed in Section 2.3. Importantly, we target the key empirical result—the increase in
experience returns after export entry into high-income destinations—for which we use the
in their different export statuses.
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Table 4: Parameters Set without Solving the Model
Parameter Notation Value Source
Total working time (years) T 40
Discount rate ρ 0.04
Number of destination markets N 10 Authors’ computation
Elasticity of matches to vacancies φ 0.3 Shimer (2005)
Depreciation of human capital δh 0.02 Manuelli and Seshadri (2014)
Convexity in production of human capital α 0.48 Manuelli and Seshadri (2014)
Stock of knowledge (n = 1, ..., N) λn 1.99 (1.25) Data on GDP per capita
Elasticity of substitution σ 5 Head and Mayer (2014)
Curvature of vacancy costs γv 1.1 Dix-Carneiro et al. (2019)
Notes: the value for the stock of knowledge is the average across N = 10 destination markets, with the standard deviation
in parenthesis.
average of reduced-form evidence in Table 3. In the model, we implement alternative re-
alizations of export fixed costs {fn} for each firm in the baseline equilibrium to compute
short-run changes in experience returns immediately following export entry. As shown by
equation (17), export entry leads to changes in the increment of human capital per time
spent, changes in time allocated to human capital accumulation, and higher labor revenues
that affect wage profiles by widening the scope of wage renegotiations.34 We relegate the
computation details to Appendix G.
To gain some intuition for how the parameters are determined, it is possible to see that
some parameters have a more direct impact on specific moments. For example, export
demand for destination n, P σn Ynτ
1−σ
n , directly affects the share of sales to n in firms’ total
sales, and the average export cost, f̄n, determines the share of firms that export to destination
n. The shape parameter of the productivity distribution ζ can be informed by the Pareto
parameter of firm employment distribution (Axtell 2001). We infer the bargaining power
β mainly from the slope of workers’ wages on firm size, as a larger β implies that workers
obtain higher shares of extra surplus in productive firms. And on-the-job search intensity η
can be informed by the share of new hires that were employed in other firms (last year).
Finally, given the strength of wage renegotiations (mainly governed by workers’ bargain-
ing power β and on-the-job search intensity η), average experience returns are informative
of the magnitude of human capital returns µ. The slope of experience returns on firm em-
ployment size and the change in experience returns due to export entry into high-income
countries are informative of the dependence of human capital returns on firm productivity
(γ1) and the knowledge stock in destination markets (γ2).
34Higher labor revenues do not directly affect wage profiles, as these changes are identical for young and
old workers.
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Table 5: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Notation Value
Constant in matching function cM 0.76
Job destruction rate κ 0.16
On-the-job search intensity η 0.12
Constant in human capital returns µ 0.07
Constant in vacancy costs cv 0.06
Workers’ bargaining power β 0.60
Elast. of human capital returns to productivity γ1 0.18
Elast. of human capital returns to market knowledge γ2 0.29
Shape parameter of productivity distribution ζ 3.40
Export demand (by destination, n = 2, ..., N) Pσn Ynτ
1−σ
n 26.73 (28.94)
Export fixed costs (by destination, n = 2, ..., N) f̄n 0.16 (0.12)
Std of export costs σf 1.56
Import demand M̄ I(pI)1−σ 0.13
Notes: The values for export demand Pσn Ynτ
1−σ
n and export fixed costs f̄n refer to the average across
N = 9 foreign markets, with the standard deviation in parenthesis. Because the demand depends on
the normalization levels, we normalize the domestic price index to P1 = 1 in the calibrated equilibrium.
4.3 Estimation Results
Table 5 presents the internally calibrated parameters. Our parameter values are reasonable
compared with the literature. For example, our calibrated job destruction rate and on-
the-job search intensity are 0.16 and 0.12 respectively, similar to 0.15 and 0.11–0.16 found
in Fajgelbaum (2019) for Argentina manufacturing firms. Our calibrated wage bargaining
power β = 0.6 is within the range of the estimates that use a bargaining model with wage
renegotiations and human capital accumulation. For example, Bagger et al. (2014) find β to
be between 0.29–0.32 for Danish firms, and Gregory (2019) estimates the bargaining power
to be 0.66 using Germany firm data. Table 6 shows that our model almost exactly or very
closely matches all the targeted moments.
4.4 Untargeted Moments
In Table 6, we compare several untargeted moments in the model to the data. Our model
implies a slightly smaller exporter wage premium (0.10) than the one estimated by the
RAIS data (controlling for individual fixed effects). Even though we did not directly target
experience effects in the calibration, our model-generated differences in experience effects
between exporters and non-exporters are similar to the data. Finally, our model predicts
negative changes in experience effects due to export entry into non-high-income countries,
in line with the reduced-form evidence in Table D.5.
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Table 6: Moments in the Model and the Data
Statistics Target Data Model
Trade Statistics
Share of exporters, by destination (N = 2, ..., 10)
√
0.032 (0.031) 0.032 (0.032)
Ratio of exports to firms’ total sales, by destination (N = 2, ..., 10)
√
0.015 (0.023) 0.015 (0.023)
Ratio of imports to firms’ total sales
√
0.14 0.13










Share of workers that remain employed after one year
√
0.87 0.87
Share of new hires that were employed in other firms (last year)
√
0.51 0.52
Pareto parameter of firm employment distribution
√
1.03 1.03
Unemployment rate 0.08 0.08
Wage Levels
Slope of wages on log firm employment
√
0.05 0.05
Exporter wage premium 0.12 0.10
Wage Profiles
Slope of experience returns on firm size
√
0.15 0.15
Average experience returns (employment-weighted)
√
0.94 0.94
Average experience returns (unweighted) 0.73 0.76
Diff in average returns btw exporters/non-exporters (employment-weighted) 0.18 0.28
Diff in average returns btw exporters/non-exporters (unweighted) 0.27 0.26
Changes in returns after entry into high-income destinations
√
0.23 0.20
Changes in returns after entry into non-high-income destinations -0.02 -0.02
Notes: The results for the share of exporters and the ratio of exports to firms’ total sales refer to the average across all
the foreign destinations, with the standard deviation in parenthesis. We compute the trade statistics using the linked
RAIS-customs data in 2000. The data on job finding rates and vacancy filling rates is from Dix-Carneiro et al. (2019), and
the unemployment rate is from the World Bank. We compute the remaining labor market statistics using the RAIS data.
Also using the RAIS data, we compute the exporter premium (the slope of wages on log firm employment) by regressing log
wage on the exporter dummy (log firm employment), individual fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Finally, we construct
experience returns in the same way as in Section 2.3. Experience returns with regard to export entry are the average of
reduced-form evidence in Tables 3 and D.5. When using the RAIS data, we apply the same restrictions as discussed in
Section 2.1 to be consistent with our empirical analysis.
4.5 Model Validation
We use the enterprise survey (ES) for Brazil in 2009 to provide additional evidence on
workers’ human capital accumulation—the key model mechanism for the within-job wage
profiles. The ES is a representative firm-level sample of an economy’s private manufacturing
and services surveyed by the World Bank. Consistent with our analysis of the RAIS data,
we restrict the ES to manufacturing firms with at least 10 employees.
The ES reports the share of workers that receive formal training and does not incorporate
other forms of human capital accumulation (such as learning from supervisors). Despite the
lack of a direct correspondence between the ES training data and our model, it is still a good
31
Table 7: Comparison of Model Results with Training Data
Dep Var Log(% of trained workers) Log(time on HC accumulation)
data data model model
Log(avg firm employment) 0.144*** 0.169* 0.070*** 0.105***
(0.030) (0.092) (0.008) (0.007)
Share of exporters -0.169 -0.138***
(0.548) (0.046)
Obs 20 20 20 20
R-squared 0.833 0.833 0.935 0.959
Notes: As the households in the model are homogeneous in their initial skills, we also control for average workers’ schooling
in the ES data. There is no other information on labor composition (e.g., occupations) in the ES. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
exercise to check whether the (unit-free) elasticity of learning intensity to employment size
is similar between the model and the data. As we cannot take the logarithm of the share of
trained workers (many firms report 0%) in the ES, we divide firms (ranked by employment)
into 20 equally sized bins and then regress the logarithm of the share of trained workers on
log average firm size across bins. In the model, we divide the firm employment distribution
into 20 equally sized bins and regress the logarithm of average time spent on human capital
accumulation on log average firm size across bins.35
Table 7 reports the results. The observed data and our model-generated data both predict
more training in larger firms, even after controlling for the share of exporters. The elasticities
of training intensity to firm employment size are slightly smaller in our model than in the
actual data. One possible reason for this difference is that small firms are more involved in
informal training, whereas the ES only reports the formal training.36
4.6 Decomposing the Returns to Experience
With the calibrated model, we now turn to understand what shapes the within-job wage
profiles. Figure 4a presents the average experience-wage profile across firms and the decom-
35In our model, all firms provide chances of human capital accumulation, and there is no extensive
margin of human capital accumulation. In principle, we can also incorporate idiosyncratic fixed costs of
human capital accumulation across firms, and thus firms that enjoy larger benefits from human capital
accumulation will also perform more of it in the extensive margin. This extension is beyond the scope of
this paper.
36For example, in the 1995 US Survey on Employer-provided Training, firms with 50–99 employees only
report 21% of their training time as formal training, whereas firms with 500+ employees report 40% of their
training time as formal training.
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Figure 4: Decomposing the Returns to Experience
(a) Overall Wage-experience Profiles (b) Difference btw Exporters/non-exporters
Notes: The data on experience returns are computed according to Section 2.3. We report the (unweighted) average
experience-wage profiles across firms in Figure 4a and the (unweighted) average differences between exporters and non-
exporters in Figure 4b.
Table 8: Changes in Returns to 20 Yrs of Experience due to Export Entry
Model-based Decomposition
Data Model Human Capital Piece Rate Investment
Entry into high-income destinations 0.23 0.20 0.08 (43%) 0.01 (5%) 0.10 (52%)
Entry into non-high-income destinations -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 (35%) 0.00 (-5%) -0.02 (70%)
Notes: The data on experience returns with regard to export entry is the average of reduced-form evidence in Table 3 and
D.5. The percentage in brackets refers to the contribution of each channel to the overall model-generated change.
position of it into different factors. We find that human capital contributes the most to
within-job wage profiles, followed by changes in human capital investment (working time).
The contribution of wage renegotiations is small, because in our calibrated model with low
on-the-job search intensity, workers are not poached very often, and those poached work-
ers with very good offers would leave the firm (not reflected by within-job wage profiles).
Figure 4b presents the decomposition of differences in experience-wage profiles between ex-
porters and non-exporters. We still find that human capital is an important factor behind
the difference. However, because of the diminishing returns of human capital investment,
the contribution of human capital relative to investment becomes smaller.
Table 8 presents the decomposition of changes in returns to experience due to export
entry. Similar to what we found in Figure 4, changes in piece rates contribute little to changes
in returns. Moreover, as expected, export entry to high-income countries is associated with
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higher human capital accumulation. However, because of the diminishing returns of human
capital investment, the contribution of human capital to changes in experience returns due
to export entry is smaller than the overall role of human capital in experience returns found
in Figure 4a. Finally, entry into non-high-income destinations is associated with negative
returns in experience returns, as exporting to non-high-income destinations may reduce the
increment in human capital per investment, and higher revenues per labor following export
entry also increase the opportunity costs of investing in human capital.
Our quantitative model finds a small role of changes in firm-worker rent sharing in ex-
plaining the wage profiles, in line with evidence in Arellano-Bover and Saltiel (2021) who
find that in Brazil, returns to experience are not much different between all workers and
the sample of displaced workers who lose previous bargaining positions. This quantitative
finding is mainly driven by a high value of workers’ wage bargaining power (β = 0.6): as
workers already gain good bargaining positions when hired, there is relatively small room
for workers’ wage to grow through wage negotiations when poached. In Section 5.4, we
show that with a low value of workers’ wage bargaining power, the role played by changes
in firm-worker rent sharing in determining wage profiles becomes much more important.
5 Counterfactual Exercises
In this section, we use our calibrated model to understand the quantitative effects of trade
openness and how the aggregate implications depend on the destination’s stock of knowledge.
We also show that changes in foreign knowledge stock can affect domestic workers’ human
capital accumulation. Finally, we provide robustness checks regarding model assumptions
and parameters.
5.1 Gains from Trade
We report the gains from trade in Table 9. The aggregate change in real income from
autarky to the calibrated economy is 9.50%. Consistent with Proposition 1, both more
human capital and higher real income per efficiency labor contribute to the gains from trade,
with a 4.86% and 4.63% increase in real income respectively. As we allow for unemployment
quantitatively, trade openness increases firms’ overall vacancy postings, which also leads to
a 0.52% employment gain. Finally, as workers invest more efficiency units in human capital,
the average working time (one minus the share of human capital investment in total human
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Figure 5: Distribution of Human Capital Growth
capital) decreases by 0.53% after trade openness.
Table 9: Gains from Trade
Changes in Real Income from Autarky to the Calibrated Economy 9.50%
Decomposition:
Real Income Per Employee
Employment Income Per Efficiency Labor Human Capital Investment
0.52% 4.63% 4.86% -0.53%
Our results point to the important role of human capital in shaping the gains from trade.
Figure 5 plots the growth in human capital per period across all the workers in the autarkic
and the calibrated economies. We find that trade openness shifts the distribution of human
capital increase to the right, indicating faster human capital after trade openness.
Motivated by decomposition of productivity growth (Foster et al. 2001), we further de-
compose changes in human capital accumulation to reflect the contributions of different




where l(z) is firm z’s employment share, and gh(z) is average growth in human capital per
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Table 10: Changes in Human Capital Growth
(a) Changes in human capital growth from autarky to the calibrated economy
Overall Within-firm Term Between-firm Term Cross-firm Term
0.16% 0.12% 0.01% 0.03%
(b) Within-firm term by firms’ status in the calibrated economy
Non-exporters Exporters (High-income) Exporters (Non-high-income) Exporters (Both Dests)
-0.03% 0.03% -0.02% 0.14%
period at firm z. Thus, the changes in growth of human capital can be written as:
g
′


















The first term captures within-firm changes in human capital growth, whereas the second
term represents reallocating employment given the initial human capital growth. The third
term represents the cross effect of reallocation and changes in the human capital growth.
Table 10 reports the results. We find that the within-firm term contributes the most to
the overall increase in human capital growth from autarky to the calibrated economy. Panel
(B) of Table 10 further decomposes the within-firm term according to firms’ export status in
the calibrated economy. We find that firms that export to both high-income and non-high-
income destinations contribute the most to the increase in the within-firm term, as they are
large in employment size and gain higher human capital returns after trade openness. The
contribution of firms that export solely to both high-income is relatively small, as they make
up small employment shares. Non-exporters and exporters that only sell to non-high-income
countries contribute negatively to the within-firm term.37
5.2 Changes in Trade Costs
In Table 11, we report changes in real income and human capital after a 10% decline in
Brazil’s export trade costs to high-income and non-high-income destinations respectively.
We find that lowering trade costs to high-income destinations by 10% would increase Brazil’s
real income by 2.70%, which is largely due to a 2.12% increase in workers’ average human
capital. Surprisingly, lowering trade costs to non-high-income destinations by 10% would
37Numerically, non-exporters and exporters that only sell to non-high-income countries only slightly
change human capital investment after trade openness. However, since their hires’ average human capi-
tal is higher (due to general equilibrium effects) after trade openness, the contribution of these firms to the
human capital growth becomes smaller.
36





10% Decline in Trade Costs
Export destinations ∆%Real Income ∆%Human Capital
By income levels:
High-income 0.081 3.58 2.70% 2.12%
Non-high-income 0.053 1.10 -0.21% -0.73%
By main export destinations:
Euro & US 0.070 3.60 2.81% 1.96%
China (2019) 0.069 1.19 0.18% -0.32%
South America 0.032 1.12 -0.12% -0.43%
reduce Brazil’s real income by 0.21%. This reduction is mainly driven by a 0.73% decline
in workers’ average human capital, as higher demand from non-high-income destinations
makes productive firms to reallocate labor away from high-income export destinations, and
higher revenues per labor due to exporting also increase the opportunity costs of investing
in human capital in the presence of hiring constraints. It is worth noting as we can not
solve the transitional dynamics, it is possible that lowering trade costs to non-high-income
destinations leads to gains in the short-run due to changes in wages and prices.
In the last three rows of Table 11, we report changes in real income and human capital
after a 10% decline in Brazil’s export trade costs to main export destinations respectively.38
In line with our previous results on high-income countries, lowering trade costs to Europe
and the US would lead to large gains in real income, which are mainly driven by gains in
workers’ human capital. On the other hand, the wage and price gains from lowering trade
costs to China or South America are largely offset by reductions human capital levels.
5.3 Changes in the Knowledge Stock
Table 12 reports changes in real income and human capital after a 10% increase in Brazil’s
trade partner’s knowledge stock. We find that higher knowledge stocks from trade partners
would increase Brazil’s real income, mainly through increases in workers’ average human
capital. Moreover, the increase is larger if the trade partners are high-income countries as
38Our baseline model is calibrated to the export data in 2000, in which year non-high-income countries
in Asia (mainly China) were still a relatively small export destination for Brazil. Brazil’s exports to China
grew very fast over the recent decades (Appendix A.1), and there has been a heated discussion regarding the
trade agreement between China and Brazil in recent years. In the counterfactual exercise regarding China,
we first recalibrate the demand and the knowledge stock of non-high-income countries in Asia to match
Brazil’s export-to-output ratio to China and the relative GDP per capita between China and Brazil in 2019.
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10% Increase in Knowledge Stock
Export destinations ∆%Real Income ∆%Human Capital
By income levels:
High-income 0.081 3.58 0.51% 0.51%
Non-high-income 0.055 1.10 0.12% 0.12%
By main export destinations:
Euro & US 0.070 3.60 0.42% 0.44%
China (2019) 0.069 1.19 0.13% 0.20%
South America 0.032 1.12 0.08% 0.08%
these countries have higher initial knowledge stocks (thus the increase in knowledge stocks
in terms of absolute values is larger). Our model thus indicates that workers’ human capital
accumulation may reflect changes in international knowledge diffusion.
5.4 Robustness Checks
We present robustness checks regarding our baseline calibration using different parameter
values and assumptions. In each case, we recalibrate the model parameters to match the
targeted moments and then compute the gains in real income and human capital from trade.39
5.4.1 Alternative Parameterization
Table 13 reports the gains from trade, by using different parameter values. In the first
exercise, we change the depreciation rate of human capital from δh = 0.02 in the baseline to
δh = 0.01, as suggested by evidence on the lifecycle record performance (Lagakos et al. 2018).
A smaller depreciation rate of human capital increases workers’ incentives to invest in human
capital, thus leading to a higher human capital level in autarky. Therefore, compared with
baseline results, trade-induced human capital investment face stronger diminishing returns
and result in a slightly smaller increase in average human capital.
In the second exercise, we alter the on-the-job search intensity from η = 0.12 in the
baseline to η = 0.4, which is the level in the US (Faberman et al. 2017). A larger on-the-job
search intensity speeds up workers’ reallocation toward firms that are more productive and
39In the case of changing model parameters, by fixing one endogenously calibrated parameter, our model
usually mismatches the most relevant targeted moment related to the fixed parameter value in the recali-
bration. For instance, by changing workers’ bargaining power to β = 0, our model is unable to generate the
positive slope of wages on firm size as shown in the data.
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offer better learning. This reallocation force also interacts with trade openness, because with
export revenues, productive firms post more vacancies and make up a larger share of the
offer distribution. Thus, we find that allowing for a larger on-the-job search intensity largely
increases the gains in real income and human capital from trade.
In the third exercise, we change workers’ bargaining power from β = 0.6 in the baseline
to β = 0, an extreme scenario considered in Fajgelbaum (2019). Compared with baseline re-
sults, assuming β = 0 implies smaller starting wages for workers, thus indicating a larger role
of wage renegotiations in explaining wage profiles (hence a smaller role for human capital).
As a result, the gains in human capital from trade becomes smaller.
For each exercise, the last three columns in Table 13 also report the decomposition of
changes in within-job experience returns (after entry into high-income destinations) into dif-
ferent factors. We find the contribution of wage negotiations is quite sensitive to workers’
bargaining power β. In our baseline model, with a high calibrated value of workers’ bar-
gaining power (β = 0.6), workers already have good bargaining positions when hired, and
there is small room for workers’ wage to grow through wage negotiations. However, with a
low value of workers’ bargaining power (β = 0), there is much larger room for wage negotia-
tions, as workers start with low bargaining positions and use poachers as the outside option
to gain better bargaining positions.40 With the same logic, as most workers already have
good bargaining positions in the baseline calibration, changing on-the-job search intensity
(poaching rate) has little impact on the contribution of wage negotiations, whereas higher
on-the-job search intensity mostly leads to more job-job transitions.41
5.4.2 Learning-by-doing
In our model, all human capital growth requires endogenous human capital investment à la
Ben-Porath, whereas human capital may also be acquired through learning-by-doing (e.g.,
Arrow 1962, Hopenhayn 1992). Appendix Section H presents the model extension to consider
that all human capital comes from learning-by-doing, and that the human capital processes
can potentially vary across firms and ages (e.g., Bagger et al. 2014, Gregory 2019).
40As shown in Section 3.3, if the joint surplus of the job at poachers is higher than workers’ current value
but lower than the joint surplus of the current job, workers’ value will increase to the joint surplus of the job
at poachers, even though they could not get a share of the difference in the joint surplus between poachers
and the current firm because of β = 0. Because workers start with low bargaining positions, the difference
between workers’ value and the joint surplus of the job at the current firm is large.
41The share of new hires that were employed in other firms (last year) increases from 51% in the baseline
model (η = 0.12) to 64% when assuming η = 0.4, indicating more job-to-job transitions with higher on-the-
job search intensity.
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Table 13: Robustness Checks
Gains from Trade
Decomposing ∆Experience Returns
(after entry into high-income dests)
∆%Real Income ∆%Human Capital Human Capital Piece Rate Investment
(1) Baseline 9.50% 4.86% 43% 5% 52%
Alternative parameterization:
(2) HC depreciation rate δh = 0.01 8.75% 4.03% 45% 6% 49%
(3) On-job search intensity η = 0.4 12.82% 8.54% 44% 5% 52%
(4) Workers’ bargaining power β = 0 9.07% 4.41% 38% 56% 6%
Alternative assumptions:
(5) Learning-by-doing 17.92% 11.02% 93% 7% 0%
Notes: The last three columns compute the contribution of each factor to changes in returns to 20 years of experience (after
entry to high-income destinations), in the same way as in Table 8.
We recalibrate the model with learning-by-doing and have two findings. First, the model
with learning-by-doing cannot produce the (untargeted) negative experience returns from en-
try to non-high-income destinations. Even though non-high-income destinations on average
have higher GDP per capita (knowledge stock) than Brazil, in our baseline model, export
revenues also raise opportunity costs of human capital investment, which reduces human
capital investment and thus reduces the experience returns from entry to non-high-income
destinations. However, this change in opportunity costs of human capital accumulation is
missing in the model with learning-by-doing. In this sense, our baseline model with endoge-
nous human capital investment matches the data better.
Second, the gains in human capital from trade openness are 11.02% in the model with
learning-by-doing, compared with 4.86% in the baseline model. Although it is difficult to
quantitatively determine the portions of human capital coming from investment and learning-
by-doing, we view these two results as informative of upper and lower bounds of the gains
in human capital from trade. With costless human capital accumulation, the model with
learning-by-doing attributes most of changes in wage profiles (due to export entry) to human
capital growth and thus provides an upper bound for the gains in human capital from trade.
On the other hand, with all human capital arising from endogenous investment, our baseline
model attributes one-half of differences in wage profiles between exporters and non-exporters
to changes in time allocated to human capital growth (Figure 4) and thus provides a lower
bound for the gains in human capital from trade.
40
6 Conclusion
Using Brazilian employer-employee and customs data, this study documents that workers’
within-job lifecycle wage growth is faster at exporters than at non-exporters. Apart from
selection of firms with higher returns to experience into exporting, we find that workers
enjoy steeper experience-wage profiles when firms export to high-income destinations. To
quantitatively understand the interaction between export markets and workers’ wage profiles,
we develop and quantify a model in which firms meet workers by random search and decide
whether to perform export activity. In the model, workers’ within-job wage grows due to
human capital growth, changes in time allocated to human capital accumulation, and wage
renegotiations. We find that human capital growth can explain roughly 40% of differences in
wage profiles between exporters and non-exporters as well as the gains in experience returns
after entry into high-income destinations. We show that the increased human capital per
worker accounts for one-half of the overall gains in real income from trade openness. We
also show that the effects of trade liberalization depend on trade partners. In particular,
lowering export costs might lower workers’ human capital and reduce the gains from trade
if the trade partners are low-income destinations.
Understanding the effects of trade on workers’ wages is important because of its impli-
cations for aggregate welfare and inequality. We view this study as one of the first steps to
empirically and quantitatively understanding the effects of trade on workers’ lifecycle wage
growth. Our results indicate that workers’ human capital accumulation may interact with
destination markets. A fruitful area for future study is how this interaction impacts the
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Appendix for Online Publication
A The Brazilian Economy
A.1 Brazilian Trade Patterns
Up to the 1990s, Brazil was a relatively closed economy to international trade. In the 1990s,
with the economic liberalization, reductions in import tariffs, and the Mercosur Trade Agree-
ment, Brazil started to open to international trade. After 1999, exports started to increase
substantially due to changes in the exchange rate regime and the large devaluation episode.
This process sped up after 2002, with a new depreciation episode and an improvement of
international agricultural prices. Table A.1 shows the trends of exports for manufacturing
goods, agricultural goods, and fuel over our sample period. It is clear that there was a sharp
increase in exports after 2000, and that manufacturing goods represented a large share of
Brazil’s exports.
Figure A.1: Brazil’s Exports in 1990–2010
Note: The data comes from the WTO. This graph shows the value of exports in millions of dollars for
manufacturing goods, agricultural goods, and fuels and mining products in the period 1990–2010.
Moreover, Rocha et al. (2008) explain how Brazil’s exports are highly diversified across
a variety of products. Apart from agriculture, Brazil intensively exports chemical products,
pharmaceutical products, aircrafts, automobiles, and home appliances. In 2004, there were
more than 10,000 different 8-digit HS products exported by more than 15,000 firms.
Table A.1 presents the share of Brazil’s exports to each destination. In the 1990s, thanks
to the Mercosur agreement, there was an increase in the share of exports destined to Latin
American countries, in particular Argentina to which its share increased from 2% in 1990 to
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Table A.1: Share of Exports (%) by Trading Partners
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010
By Region By Country (Top 15)
Europe & Central Asia 31.93 30.78 25.63 China 1.22 1.97 15.25
East Asia & Pacific 15.34 10.93 25.11 United States 24.62 24.29 9.64
Latin America & Caribbean 11.67 24.99 23.26 Argentina 2.05 11.32 9.17
United States 24.62 24.29 9.64 Netherlands 7.94 5.07 5.07
Middle East & North Africa 0 3.35 7.33 Germany 5.69 4.58 4.03
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.91 1.52 2.49 Japan 7.48 4.49 3.54
United Kingdom 3.01 2.72 2.3
Chile 1.54 2.26 2.11
Italy 5.14 3.89 2.1
Russian Federation 0 0.77 2.06
Spain 2.24 1.83 1.93
Venezuela 0.85 1.37 1.91
Korea, Rep. 1.73 1.05 1.86
Mexico 1.61 3.11 1.84
France 2.87 3.25 1.79
Note: This table presents the share of exports to each destination market. The data is collected from the WITS (the
World Integrated Trade Solution). The countries and regions are ranked by the share of exports in 2010.
11% in 2000. While the U.S. was the biggest markets for Brazilian exporters in 1990 with
25% of total exports, this share decreased to 10% in 2010. Between 1990 and 2010, the share
of exports destined to East Asia and the Pacific increased, mostly explained by the increase
in exports going to China (1% in 1990 to 15% in 2010). The main takeaway is that Brazil
exports to a wide variety of destinations with around half of total exports going to developed
economies (e.g., the U.S., Eurozone, Japan) and half going to other developing economies.
Table A.2 presents the share of total exports, the value, and the revealed comparative
advantage index for main products Brazil exported in the years 1990 and 2010. 22% of
Brazil’s exports in 1990 and 42% in 2010 were raw materials. This means that around 80%
(60%) of its exports were manufactured goods in 1990 (2010). Moreover, although the share
of raw materials in total exports increased in this period, it is worth noting that the export
value of manufactured products also substantially increased.
A.2 Brazilian Economic Background and Informality
One caveat of the analysis is that RAIS misses the informal firms. Here we provide a
discussion on the economic and political background of the Brazilian informal labor market.
Because of the economic instability and high unemployment rates due to the recession, the
share of unregistered employees (informal workers) in total employees grew from 1990 to 2003.
After 2002, an economic expansion took place with a rapid increase in GDP, improvements
in social-economic indicators, and a considerable decrease in the amount of unemployment
and unregistered workers. For an extensive review of policies and the background about the
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Table A.2: Exports by Products
Product Share (%) Value (U.S.$ Mill) RCAI
1990 2010 1990 2010 1990 2010
By Type
Raw materials 21.37 41.93 6713 84671 1.84 2.93
Intermediate goods 39.01 27.29 12252 55109 1.75 1.28
Consumer goods 20.81 14.62 6537 29517 0.56 0.44
Capital goods 15.45 14.27 4854 28822 0.35 0.42
By Product
Minerals 8.93 15.63 2,804 31,557 10.26 10.79
Food Products 16.83 13.4 5,287 27,056 4.46 4.21
Vegetable 9.02 10.88 2,831 21,961 2.61 3.81
Fuels 2.17 9.83 682 19,843 0.03 0.61
Transportation 7.32 8.55 2,299 17,272 0.35 0.88
Mach and Elec 11.17 8.03 3,509 16,216 0.32 0.28
Metals 17.17 7.14 5,393 14,412 2.89 0.9
Animal 2.07 6.7 650 13,526 0.8 3.46
Chemicals 4.89 5.06 1,535 10,221 0.62 0.57
Wood 5.28 4.33 1,659 8,740 0.95 2.11
Miscellaneous 2.43 2.98 762 6,023 0.17 0.33
Plastic or Rubber 2.56 2.65 804 5,341 0.5 0.57
Stone and Glass 1.37 1.96 431 3,954 0.56 0.36
Textiles and Clothing 3.97 1.12 1,248 2,265 0.67 0.28
Hides and Skins 1.03 0.92 323 1,865 1.62 1.5
Footwear 3.78 0.82 1,188 1,653 1.95 1.07
Note: This table presents the share of exports in Columns 1–2, the value of exports in Columns 3–4,
and the revealed comparative advantage indices in columns 5–6 for the years 2010 and 1990. The data is
collected from WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution). The products and products types are ranked
by the share of exports in 2010.
informal sector in Brazil, see Dix-Carneiro et al. (2019).
Figure A.2a shows unregistered workers as a share of total employees. The informality
rate sharply declined in recent decades, from around 33% in the 1990s to 23% in the 2010’s.
In Brazil’s Population Census 2000 and 2010, we have information on the contract status
of wage workers. We split the sample into wage workers with formal contracts and with
no formal contracts. Because the data is only available for two years, we are not able to
apply the HLT method. As some reference, we draw the experience-wage profiles in the
cross section. Figure A.3a plots both profiles and shows that formal workers have stepper
experience-wage profiles than informal workers.
Moreover, besides formal and informal employees, Brazilian employment also includes
self-employed workers, employers, and unpaid workers, and these three types of employment
may not appear in RAIS (except for employers who receive a wage). Figure A.2b shows the
share of self-employed workers, employers and unpaid workers in Brazilian total employment.
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(a) Share of Informal Employees (b) Share of Non-employees in Occupied Pop
Note: The left-hand figure shows the share of unregistered employees in total employees. The data comes from the PNAD
censuses. In the right-hand panel, the share of self-employed people represents the ratio of the amount of self-employed workers
to total occupied population. The share "+ employers" is the share of self-employed and employers in total occupied population.
The share "+ Unpaid" is the share of self-employed, employers, and unpaid workers in total occupied population.
These three types of employment represented 30–40% of Brazilian employment in the 90’s and
2000’s. We use Brazilian Population Census in 1991, 2000, and 2010 to compare experience-
wage profiles for Brazilian wage workers and self-employed workers. We estimate experience-
wage profiles by applying the HLT method. Differing from the Mincer regressions estimated
in Section 2.2, because we cannot identify the same individuals in multiple rounds of Brazilian
Population Census, we do not use the individual-level wage growth (we instead control for
cohort effects of birth years). We apply the identical Mincer regression of wage levels as
in Lagakos et al. (2018), with 10 years of no experience returns in the end of the working
life and a 0% depreciation rate. As shown in Figure A.3b, we find that wage workers have
steeper profiles than self-employed workers.
Dix-Carneiro et al. (2019) show that within tradable sectors, most of workers are formally
employed. Moreover, they show that the transition between formality and informality is
relatively low. Therefore, given our focus on tradable industries, informality should not be
a big issue. Nevertheless, even considering informal workers, because exporters are mostly
formal firms, it is likely that non-exporters hire informal workers more intensively than
exporters. By missing informal workers, we may underestimate the difference in experience-
wage profiles between exporters and non-exporters and the benefits of trade in inducing
workers’ transition from infomral to formal firms in our main results.
B Description of the RAIS and Customs Data
We use the Brazilian employer-employee data named RAIS (Relacao Anual de Informacoes
Sociais). Establishments receive 14-digit unique permanent tax codes (CNPJ), from which
we can identify firms by the first 8 digits of the code (Muendler et al. 2012). We focus
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(a) Informal and Formal Workers (b) Wage and Self-employed Workers
Note: The left-hand figure shows experience-wage profiles separately for male wage workers with and without formal contracts.
We rely on Brazilian Census data available in IPUMS for the years 2000 and 2010. The right-hand figure shows experience-wage
profiles separately for male wage workers and male self-employed workers, derived from the HLT method (identical regression
as in Lagakos et al. (2018)). We rely on Brazilian Census data available in IPUMS for the years 1991, 2000, and 2010.
on firms and aggregate establishments into the affiliated firms. Firms are mandated by
law to annually provide workers’ information to RAIS, and thus the data contains annual
information on all workers employed in the Brazilian formal sector. The data is available
from 1986. Nonetheless, the detailed data on age and hours worked is only available after
1994, and these two variables are important to accurately measure experience-wage profiles.
The occupation classification in RAIS is based on the CBO (Classificação Brasileira
de Ocupações), which has more than 350 categories and can be aggregated to 5 broad
occupations (professionals, technical workers, other white-collar workers, skilled blue-collar
workers, and unskilled blue-collar workers). The industry classification is based on the
CNAE (Classificação Nacional de Atividade Econômica), which has 564 5-digit industries.
Although there is available data on agriculture and services, we only focus on manufacturing
industries, as manufacturing firms are tradable and extensively studied in the literature.
The data contains monthly average wage and wages of December, which are measured by
multiples of the contemporaneous minimum wage. We follow Menezes-Filho et al. (2008)
to transform these earnings into the Brazilian Real and deflate them to the August 1994
price level. For the cases with more than one observations per worker-year, we keep the
observation with the highest hourly wage (Dix-Carneiro 2014). Most workers are employed
only at one firm in a year, and the average number of observations per worker-year is roughly
1.1.
We use firm IDs to merge the RAIS data with Brazilian customs declarations for merchan-
dise exports collected at SECEX (Secretaria de Comércio Exterior) for the years 1994–2010,
following Aguayo-Tellez et al. (2010). Thus, we use RAIS merged with customs data for
the 1994–2010 period. From Brazilian customs declarations, we have data on destination
markets for all firms in 1994–2010. We also have detailed data on export value and quantity
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by 8-digit HS products and destinations for the years 1997–2000.
B.1 A First Glance at Experience-Wage Profiles
Using the raw data, we first show differences in experience-wage profiles between exporters
and non-exporters in the cross section. We measure workers’ potential experience as years
elapsed since finishing schooling (min{age-18,age-6-educ}). In each year, we obtain experience-
wage profiles by computing the average log hourly wage for workers in each 5-year experience
bin x ∈ X ={1–5,6–10,...,36–40}, separately for workers observed in exporting and non-
exporting firms. Because we are interested in lifecycle wage growth, we normalize the value
of the first experience bin (1–5 years of experience) to 0 for each experience-wage profile.
Finally, we average profiles across years to obtain experience-wage profiles for exporters and
non-exporters, respectively.
In Table B.1, we report the average log wage for workers with 36–40 years of experience
relative to 1–5 years of experience (normalization). Column (1) in Panel A shows that, at
exporters (non-exporters), the average log wage of workers with 36–40 years of experience is
0.74 (0.49) higher than workers with 1–5 years of experience.42 This pattern holds in different
time periods (Columns (2)–(3)). More notably, it is not caused by lower starting wages of
workers at exporters. In the last two columns of Panel A, we recompute the average log wage
of each experience bin relative to workers with 1–5 years of experience at non-exporters for
any given year. We find that workers with 1–5 years of experience already have higher wages
at exporters than at non-exporters. This gap grows larger as workers’ experience increases.
In light of potential composition effects (exporters are larger and have better workforce),
in Panels B to D of Table B.1, we recompute the result in Column (1) of Panel A within the
same workers’ education levels, occupations, or firm size categories. Consistent with recent
papers (Islam et al. 2018, Lagakos et al. 2018), we find that the experience-wage profile is
steeper for workers with higher education levels (Panel B), in cognitive occupations (Panel
C),43 and in larger firms (Panel D). Moreover, we find that within all of these categories,
workers have higher lifecycle wage growth at exporters than at non-exporters.
There are many identification problems with this first-pass attempt: for example, workers
observed at exporters in a given year may have previously accumulated work experience at
non-exporters in their earlier career. Nonetheless, the preliminary evidence from the raw data
indicates that workers at exporters may have steeper experience-wage profiles than workers at
non-exporters. With this suggestive pattern in mind, we formally estimate experience-wage
profiles in Section 2.2.
42Our results are comparable to Lagakos et al. (2018) who use Brazilian Population Census and document
that the percent wage increase of 36–40 years of experience relative to 1–5 years of experience is around 60%
(see Figure 1 in Lagakos et al. (2018)).
43Cognitive occupations refer to professionals, technicians, and other white-collar workers.
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Table B.1: Average Log Wage of Workers with 36–40 Years of Experience Relative to 1–5
Years of Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Aggregate profiles
Rel. to non-exporters’ first bin
all 1994–2000 2001–2010 first bin 40 years of exp
Exporter 0.74 0.67 0.79 0.29 1.04
Non-Exp 0.49 0.48 0.51 0 0.50
Difference 0.25 0.19 0.28 0.29 0.54
Panel B: Aggregate profiles by education level
illiterate primary middle school high school college
Exporter 0.22 0.69 0.84 1.29 1.43
Non-Exp 0.18 0.46 0.55 0.82 1.08
Difference 0.04 0.23 0.29 0.47 0.35








Exporter 1.10 0.99 0.52 0.57 0.23
Non-Exp 0.85 0.71 0.34 0.44 0.16
Difference 0.25 0.28 0.18 0.13 0.07
Panel D: Aggregate profiles by firm size
10-50 50-100 100-500 500-1000 1000+
Exporter 0.55 0.61 0.69 0.77 0.81
Non-Exp 0.43 0.50 0.59 0.58 0.47
Difference 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.19 0.34
Note: This table reports the average log wage for workers with 36–40 years of experience relative to 1–5 years
of experience (normalization). In each year, we obtain experience-wage profiles by computing the average log
hourly wage for workers in each 5–year experience bin, separately for workers observed at exporters and non-
exporters. We normalize the value of the first experience bin (1–5 years of experience) to 0 for each experience-
wage profile. Finally, we average profiles across years to obtain experience-wage profiles for exporters and
non-exporters, respectively. Columns (4)–(5) of Panel A use the average log wage of workers with 1–5 years of
experience at non-exporters as normalization.
C Empirical Method and Additional Results
C.1 HLT Method
To implement the HLT method, we define time trends {ζst} from time effects {γst}: ζst =






it + ζst + ǫit. (C.1)
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1, as explained in the main text. Using the assumption φ31−35s + φ
36−40
s = 0, we can solve
the collinearity problem.
The HLT method in Lagakos et al. (2018) is slightly different. In Lagakos et al. (2018),
we need to first decompose time effects into trend and cyclical components:
γst = gst+ est, (C.2)






it + gs + (est − est−1) + ǫit. (C.3)
We then restrict cyclical components to average zero over the time period
∑
t est = 0 and
to be orthogonal to a time trend
∑
t estt = 0. These two restrictions reduce the freedom of
{est} by two and resolve the collinearity problem of time and experience returns (est and∑
xD
x
it), as also used in Deaton (1997) and Aguiar and Hurst (2013) in estimating lifecycle
profiles. To pin down the wage trend gs, we exploit the additional assumption that there are
no experience returns in the last 10 years of experience, φ31−35s + φ
36−40
s = 0.
In short, the first method transforms time effects {γst} into trends {ζst}, which naturally
reduces the freedom of parameters by one, and then introduces one additional restriction
φ31−35s + φ
36−40
s = 0 to solve the collinearity problem. The HLT method in Lagakos et al.
(2018) adds two restrictions on original time effects γst and introduces one additional param-




s = 0 to pin down. Empirically,
we find that these two different ways of dealing with time effects lead to very similar results.
C.2 Propensity-score Matching
We discuss the details of the propensity-score matching in Heckman et al. (1997). We are
interested in the average effects of exporting on the export entrants as follows:
E(y1ω − y0ω|Dω = 1) = E(y1ω|Dω = 1)− E(y0ω|Dω = 1). (C.4)
where the subscript denotes the export status, and D is the dummy variable for start-
ing to export. However, the challenge is that the counterfactual scenario of non-exporting
E(y0ω|Dω = 1) is not observable. In order to identify this group, we assume that all difference
between exporters and the appropriate control group can be captured by a set of observables
Xω,t. Specially, we first estimate each firm’s probability Pr(Xω) to start to export as a
function of observables Xω,t based on a Probit model. Then, based on the assumption that














where Cp is the region of common support, and I1 is the set of new exporters. Nx is the
number of new exporters that are in the common support. I0 is the set of non-exporters.
W (ω, ω′) is the weight of each non-exporter ω′ in constructing the control group, with
∑
ω′∈Cp∩I0
W (ω, ω′) = 1 for each treated firm ω. In our main results, the matching is based
on the method of the nearest neighbor, which selects a non-exporting firm which has a
propensity score closest to that of the export entrant.







y1ω − y0ω,−1 −
∑
ω′∈Cp∩I0
W (ω, ω′)(y0ω′ − y0ω′,−1)

 (C.6)
where y0ω,−1 is the outcome in the τ = −1 period (previous period). We can also construct
estimates of changes in future outcomes after starting to export following De Loecker (2007).
C.3 Panel Estimation of Workers’ Experience Effects
In this section, we track workers over time and estimate how workers’ experience affects
workers’ current wages. Consider the Mincer regression:







ik′ + µi + γkt + ǫikt, (C.7)
where i, k and t represent individual, type of firms, and time, separately. wikt is the log
wage for an individual i currently working in type-k firms k ∈ {e, n}, either exporters (e) or
non-exporters (n). The variable si represents schooling, the returns of which can depend on
the current firm type. The variable expxik′ denotes her years of experience in type-k
′ firms
k′ ∈ {e, n} in each experience bin x of her work history (before current year). φxk′ refers
to the effect of a one-year increase in experience expxik′ on current wages. We let φ
x
k′ differ
across experience bins so that experience returns vary across different stages of life. γkt is a
vector of time effects specific to firm types; and µi is a vector of individual fixed effects.
To proceed with estimation of our regression in equation (C.7), we construct a panel
of workers such that their work history can be fully observed. To achieve this goal, we
supplement our sample in 1994–2010 with the RAIS data in 1986–1993, for which we do
not observe hourly wage but can use these years’ data to construct workers’ experience. We
focus on workers that first appeared in the database under 25 years old44 and construct their
full employment history in RAIS. As workers may disappear in some years’ RAIS data, the
actual work history constructed from the RAIS data does not have the collinearity problem
with the year effects. Our results are robust if we use the sample of workers that do not
have breaks in their work history in the RAIS data. By construction, due to the time length
of our sample, the highest observed experience is 25 years. As we do not restrict workers’
44This aims to rule out old workers for whom we do not observe their previous employment histories,
particularly those who started work before 1986 or were employed in the informal sector in their early life.
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wages to be within a job, we can explore how experience affects wages after switching firms.
Column (1) of Table C.1 reports the estimation results. We do not report the returns
to 21–25 years of experience, for which there are few observations and thus the estimates
are noisy. The results show that returns to schooling are small, because after controlling
individual fixed effects, identification of returns to education depends on within-individual
changes in schooling over time (subject to large noises). Instead, a cross-sectional Mincer
regression indicates that the return to education is 8.6% per year of schooling, in close accord
with the literature (e.g., Young 2013). More importantly, according to our estimation results,
if a new worker with average schooling (9 years) starts her job at exporters, she enjoys a
10.2% wage premium relative to a job at non-exporters. If she continues to work at exporters,
she would enjoy a 16.5% higher wage growth than working at non-exporters over 20 years of
experience, in line with our estimation results in Section 2.2.
Column (2) introduces the years of working at exporters/non-exporters in the same firm
as the current firm into regression (C.7), as experience in the same firm may capture firm-
specific factors (e.g., firm-specific learning or changes in bargaining positions) and lead to
higher wages. Due to the space constraints, we do not report the coefficients on the years of
working at non-exporters in the same firm as the current firm. We do find that the previous
experience in the same firm is more valuable. However, after controlling for same-firm effects,
we still find sizable returns to previous experience at exporters. According to the estimates,
if a worker starts to work in a new firm after 20 years of experience in an exporter, she would
enjoy a 10.5% higher wage than previously working at non-exporters for 20 years.
In Column (3) of Table C.1, we introduce the interaction between the years of working
at exporters and the ratio of the amount of high-income destinations to the amount of
all destinations into regression (C.7), in order to explore the destination-specific effects.
According to the results, we find that if a worker accumulates 20 years of experience at
exporters from the beginning of the career, working at exporters that only export to high-
income destinations would lead to a 15% higher wage growth than working at exporters
that only export to non-high-income destinations. This result is in similar magnitude to our
firm-level results in Table 2.
Finally, we analyze a sample of involuntarily displaced workers because their returns
to previous experience are more likely to be shaped by learning than seniority after dis-
placement, following the labor literature (Jacobson et al. 1993, Dustmann and Meghir 2005,
Arellano-Bover and Saltiel 2021). We focus on the events of firm closure, which we define as
that large firms (with more than 50 employees) close down and do not subsequently show
up. We identify 5,633 events of manufacturing firm closure between 1994–2010. We consider
employees who were employed in the year of firm closure and study how their experience af-
fected their post-displacement earnings (at first appearance after displacement). In Columns
(4)–(6), we replicate Columns (1)–(3) using displaced workers’ earnings, except that we do
not control for workers’ fixed effects as few workers have experienced multiple displacement
events. We still find that previous experience at exporters is more valuable than previous
experience at non-exporters, especially when exporters sell to high-income destinations. In
particular, if a worker has accumulated 20 years of experience at exporters before displace-
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ment, previously working at exporters that only export to high-income destinations would
lead to 15% higher post-displacement earnings than previously working at exporters that
only export to non-high-income destinations.
Table C.1: Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wage (Current Year)
All Young Workers Displaced Young Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Schooling 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.058***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Schooling × Exporter 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exporter 0.048*** 0.027*** 0.048*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Years of working at exporters
(1–5 years of work history)
0.104*** 0.080*** 0.102*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.094***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of working at non-exporters
(1–5 years of work history)
0.093*** 0.079*** 0.093*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of working at exporters
(6–10 years of work history)
0.053*** 0.030*** 0.050*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.062***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of working at non-exporters
(6–10 years of work history)
0.044*** 0.025*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.044***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of working at exporters
(11–15 years of work history)
0.032*** 0.019*** 0.028*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.040***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of working at non-exporters
(11–15 years of work history)
0.026*** 0.012*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Years of working at exporters
(16–20 years of work history)
0.024*** 0.012*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Years of working at non-exporters
(16–20 years of work history)
0.017*** 0.004*** 0.017*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Years of working at exporters (1–5 years)
& in same firm as current firm
0.022*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.002)
Years of working at exporters (1–5 years)
× ratio of #high-income dests
0.008*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.002)
Years of working at exporters (6–10 years)
& in same firm as current firm
0.026*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.002)
Years of working at exporters (6–10 years)
× ratio of #high-income dests
0.007*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.003)
Years of working at exporters (11–15 years)
& in same firm as current firm
0.016*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.005)
Years of working at exporters (11–15 years)
× ratio of #high-income dests
0.009*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.005)
Years of working at exporters (16–20 years)
& in same firm as current firm
0.014*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.011)
Years of working at exporters (16–20 years)
× ratio of #high-income dests
0.006*** 0.015
(0.001) (0.010)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,793,680 41,793,680 41,793,680 293,462 293,462 293,462
R2 0.863 0.865 0.863 0.487 0.488 0.488
Note: The coefficients on the exporter dummy are the average difference of the time effects between exporters and
non-exporters. We do not report the returns to 21–25 years of experience, for which there are few observations and thus
the estimates are noisy. Due to the space constraints, we also do not report the coefficients on the years of working at
non-exporters in the same firm as the current firm in Columns (2) and (5). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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D Additional Tables
Table D.1: Wage Profiles and Firm Characteristics (Controlling for Previous Experience)
Dep Var: Firm-year-level Returns to 20 Yrs of Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample period 94–10 94–10 94–10 97–00 97–00 97–00
Exporter 0.278*** 0.031 -0.008 -0.055 -0.111 -0.081
(0.013) (0.030) (0.036) (0.075) (0.127) (0.126)
Exporter × ratio of
# high-income to # total dests
0.126*** 0.231**
(0.053) (0.112)
Exporter × share of









0.004 0.043 0.024 0.025
(0.021) (0.053) (0.060) (0.060)
Exporter ×
log(avg exports per employee)
0.015 0.013
(0.022) (0.022)
Duration of workers’ previous
experience at exporters
-0.090*** -0.084*** -0.259** -0.260** -0.260**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
Duration of workers’ previous
experience at exporters (high-income dests)
0.061** 0.052* -0.064 -0.067 -0.067
(0.028) (0.028) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122)
Duration of firms’ previous
export participation
0.017 0.013 0.127* 0.132* 0.128*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071)
Duration of firms’ previous
export participation (high-income dests)
-0.016 -0.011 0.019 0.012 0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 344,785 344,785 344,785 77,888 77,888 77,888
R-squared 0.007 0.318 0.318 0.488 0.488 0.488
Note: This table presents estimates from regressions of firm-year-level returns to 20 years of experience on firm character-
istics. The baseline group is non-exporters. The controls are the shares of high-school and cognitive workers in the firm’s
workforce as well as firm size. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. We
define the duration as follows. Duration of workers’ previous experience at exporters: we compute each worker’s duration
of work history (before current year) at exporters and then take the average across all workers at the current firm in the
current year. Duration of workers’ previous experience at exporters (high-income dests): we compute each worker’s duration
of work history (before current year) at exporters that export to high-income destinations and then take the average across
all workers at the current firm in the current year. Duration of firms’ previous export participation: we compute the firm’s
duration of export participation (before current year). Duration of firms’ previous export participation (high-income dests):
we compute the firm’s duration of export participation in high-income destinations (before current year).
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Table D.2: Wage Profiles and Firm Characteristics
Dep Var: Firm-year-level Returns to 20 Yrs of Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
manufacturing
Industry group differentiated non-differentiated agri & mining
Period 94–10 97–00 94–10 97–00 94–10 97–00
Exporter -0.005 -0.107 -0.027 0.053 0.295 -0.757
(0.055) (0.254) (0.046) (0.211) (0.187) (0.542)
Exporter × ratio of
# high-income to # total dests
0.251*** 0.432* 0.046 0.178 -0.225 -0.178
(0.084) (0.245) (0.067) (0.175) (0.226) (0.433)
Exporter ×
log(# total dests)
-0.003 0.014 -0.015 0.002 -0.017 0.264
(0.032) (0.123) (0.026) (0.095) (0.099) (0.224)
Exporter ×
log(avg exports per employee)
0.024 -0.010 0.113
(0.044) (0.035) (0.078)
Industry, Year and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 153,733 36,008 189,564 43,355 87,035 20,954
R-squared 0.337 0.533 0.333 0.544 0.308 0.428
Note: This table presents regressions of firm-year-level returns to 20 years of experience on firm characteristics. The baseline
group is non-exporters. The controls are the shares of high-school and cognitive workers in the firm’s workforce as well as
firm employment size. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table D.3: Labor Composition for New Exporters to High-income Destinations
Post-exporting period 0 1 2 3
(a) Outcome: share of high-school grads
Export entry 0.008 0.019** 0.024*** 0.036***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Nr treated 4,164 2,191 1,693 1,477
Nr controls 158,734 118,285 93,056 75,150
(b) Outcome: share of cognitive occupations
Export entry -0.001 -0.005 0.004 0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Notes: The table reports the difference of labor composition between new exporters and non-exporters. The propensity
score is estimated based on a Probit model, including a host of pre-exporting (previous year) firm characteristics—returns
to 20 years of experience, the shares of high-school and cognitive workers, firm size, and export status to non-high-income
destinations, as well as industry and year fixed effects. The number of the treated and the control units on the common
support decreases with post-exporting periods as there are fewer firms with future returns to experience. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table D.4: Returns to 20 Years of Experience of New Exporters to High-income
Destinations (for Export Exiters in Post-exporting Periods)
Post-exporting period 1 2 3
(a) Outcome: returns to experience
Export entry -0.012 0.120 0.041
(0.130) (0.110) (0.102)
Nr treated 1,466 1,552 1,416
Nr controls 106,910 93,695 75,061
(b) Outcome: growth in returns (relative to τ = −1 period)
Export entry 0.057 0.276* 0.125
(0.180) (0.156) (0.156)
Notes: The table reports the difference of returns to experience and growth in returns (relative to τ = −1 period) between
export entrants that stop exporting in the corresponding period and non-exporters. The propensity score is estimated
based on a Probit model, including a host of pre-exporting (previous year) firm characteristics—returns to 20 years of
experience, the shares of high-school and cognitive workers, firm size, and export status to non-high-income destinations, as
well as industry and year fixed effects. The number of the treated and the control units on the common support decreases
with post-exporting periods as there are fewer firms with future returns to experience. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table D.5: Returns to 20 Years of Experience of New Exporters to Non-high-income
Destinations
Post-exporting period 0 1 2 3
(a) Outcome: returns to experience
Export entry 0.014 -0.004 -0.085 -0.023
(0.077) (0.091) (0.120) (0.111)
Nr treated 4,656 2,629 2,072 1,767
Nr controls 136,986 100,340 78,052 62,229
(b) Outcome: growth in returns (relative to τ = −1 period)
Export entry -0.023 -0.027 0.047 -0.031
(0.110) (0.131) (0.167) (0.164)
Notes: The table reports the difference of returns to experience and growth in returns (relative to τ = −1 period) between
new exporters and non-exporters. The propensity score is estimated based on a Probit model, including a host of pre-
exporting (previous year) firm characteristics—returns to 20 years of experience, the shares of high-school and cognitive
workers, firm size, and export status to high-income destinations, as well as industry and year fixed effects. The number
of the treated and the control units on the common support decreases with post-exporting periods as there are fewer firms
with future returns to experience. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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E Additional Graphs
Figure E.1: Log Hourly Wage Increase by Exporters and Non-exporters
Note: This figure presents the (employment-weighted) within-industry experience-wage profiles for workers at exporters and
non-exporters, from estimating equation (1) using the Brazilian data between 1994–2010. We assume the final 5 years with no
experience returns.
Figure E.2: Dynamics of Firms’ First Entry Into Non-high-income Destinations
Note: The figure shows the βτ parameters from estimating equation (4), except for that the βτ parameters are coefficients on
indicators for time periods relative to the firm’s first export entry into non-high-income destinations. The dependent variable is
firm-year-level returns to 20 years of experience. The regression controls for firm fixed effects, industry fixed effects, year fixed
effects, the shares of high-school graduates and cognitive workers in the workforce, firm size, and a dummy variable indicating
whether the firm is exporting to a high-income destination. To estimate the βτ parameters after entry, we require that firms
remain exporting to non-high-income destinations.
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F Proofs
F.1 Proof of Optimal Quantities


























































































F.2 Proof of Proposition 1
F.2.1 Optimal Hires and Export Choices
Because unemployment benefits Vt = 0 and the discount rate ρ is large enough, firms obtain
a fixed portion (1− β) of total sales according to equation (13). Given destination {In(z)},
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is the number of workers hired by the firm in each period, and h̄ is the average
efficiency unit per worker. Because discount rate ρ is large enough, time spent on human
capital accumulation i is relatively small compared with h̄ and thus does not show up. The
first-order condition of equation (F.5) is:



















Solving this yields the optimal v,
v =
(






































n , we obtain
pn(z) =
στncvP1V
(σ − 1)(1− β)zh̄ , (F.8)
which resembles a Melitz-Chaney-type model with labor costs cvP1V
(1−β)h̄
per efficiency unit, and
σ
σ−1
is the constant markup. Because workers capture a portion β of firms’ revenue, workers’
average wage at firm z is






(σ − 1)(1− β) , (F.9)
which is identical across firms.
As shown in equation (F.7), under optimal choices of hires, the firm’s optimal choice is
independent of other destinations. Therefore, export decisions are made independently for
each destination. A firm will export to destination n if (1− β)pn(z)yn(z) ≥ fnP1.
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F.2.2 Trade Shares in the Home Market
Let Πd denote the share of expenditures devoted to domestic goods in the home country.































where we use equation (F.8). Note this is a standard gravity equation with trade elasticity
α, as typically used in the trade literature (reviewd by Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare 2014).
















F.2.3 Gains from Trade



















is real wage, and β is the ratio of wage payments to total revenue. We denote the
variables in the autarkic economy with superscript auc. Note that Πd = 1 in autarky. Then










changes in average efficiency labor per employee
. (F.13)
This completes the proof.
G Computation Algorithm
The computation strategy of the model’s calibration is as follows.
1. We first divide the productivity distribution into 500 equally sized bins according to
the cumulative probability of the productivity distribution and then draw a firm from
the middle point of each bin.
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2. We then draw the random realization of export fixed costs for each firm and each
destination. The realizations of export costs are fixed in the baseline equilibrium
throughout the paper. We also experiment with 50 different realizations for each firm
and destination and then use the average simulation results to compute the model
moments, and the results are very similar (though computationally cumbersome).
3. Given a set of parameters, we compute the baseline equilibrium. To compute moments
regarding changes immediately following export entry, we implement a different real-
ization of export fixed costs for each firm on the baseline equilibrium. As it is difficult
to compute the full transitional dynamics, we focus on the immediate period of export
entry with firms’ employment distribution and aggregate variables being the same as
in the baseline equilibrium. We compute how the changes (due to export entry) in
labor revenue and the increment in human capital per time spent affect experience ef-
fects. This is motivated by our estimated effects in Table 3 that capture the short-run
effects.45 We search the internally calibrated parameters to minimize the absolute dif-
ference between the data moments and the model moments in the baseline equilibrium
and regarding export entry.
H Learning-by-doing
Instead of assuming endogenous choices of human capital investment, an alternative approach
of incorporating human capital is to assume learning-by-doing: the human capital processes
are exogenously given and can potentially vary across firms and ages (e.g., Bagger et al.
2014, Gregory 2019). In particular, we assume for a worker of age t at firm z, the human
capital growth is exogenously given by:






Compared with our baseline model, we now assume: 1) there is no time needed for human
capital accumulation, and this implies it = 0 in our baseline results; 2) to generate reduction
in learning speed in later ages, we introduce an additional parameter ρh > 0.
We recalibrate our model parameters to the targeted moments with this alternative as-
sumption on human capital growth.46 We find that the model with this learning-by-doing
assumption is unable to generate the (untargeted) negative change in experience returns
from entry to non-high-income destinations, as shown in Table 8. Even though non-high-
income destinations on average have higher GDP per capita than Brazil, our baseline model
is able to generate the negative experience returns from entry to non-high-income destina-
tions because export revenues also raise the opportunity cost of human capital investment
45Our algorithm is similar to the short-run partial-equilibrium analysis frequently used in the recent devel-
opment literature (Buera, Kaboski and Yongseok 2021, Buera, Kaboski and Townsend 2021) to incorporate
the reduced-form evidence into a general-equilibrium analysis.
46As we introduced a new parameter ρh, we also introduce a new targeted moment—the returns to the
first 5 years of workers’ experience.
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Table H.1: Changes in Returns to 20 Yrs of Experience due to Export Entry
(Learning-by-doing)
Model-based Decomposition
Data Model Human Capital Piece Rate Investment
Entry into high-income destinations 0.23 0.21 0.195 (93%) 0.015 (7%) 0 (0%)
Entry into non-high-income destinations -0.02 0.01 0.01 (86%) 0.00 (14%) 0 (0%)
Notes: The data on experience returns with regard to export entry is the average of reduced-form evidence in Table 3 and
D.5. The percentage in brackets refer to the contribution of each channel to the overall model-generated change.
and thus reduce human capital investment. However, this change in opportunity costs of
human capital accumulation does not show up in the model with learning-by-doing.
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